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Abstract. We show how to derive natural deduction systems and modal lambda calculi
for constructive versions of the necessity fragments of the modal logics K, T, K4, GL
by exploiting a pattern found in sequent calculus. We investigate the metatheory of the
resulting calculi, and study a notion of reduction for them, for which confluence and
strong normalisation hold. We also consider the subformula property, and present sound
and complete categorical semantics.
1. Introduction: Constructive modalities and λ-calculi
The study of the Curry-Howard correspondence (Howard, 1980; Girard et al., 1989) between
modal logics and modal λ-calculi began at the dawn of the 1990s, and was heralded by
the discovery of Linear Logic. Early milestones include Moggi’s monadic metalanguage
(Moggi, 1991), and the discovery of a constructive S4 modality by Bierman and de Paiva
(1992, 1996, 2000). These were followed by multiple developments, as well as some first
applications. This first era is surveyed by de Paiva et al. (2004).
Since the early 2000s this field has largely been commandeered by the programming
language community. As a result, there has been less focus on theoretical aspects, but great
strides have been made in applications. These include—amongst others—the modelling of
dependency and secure programming languagues by Abadi et al. (1999); a λ-calculus for
distributed computing and mobile code (Murphy et al., 2004); new modal approaches to
metaprogramming (Taha and Nielsen, 2003; Tsukada and Igarashi, 2010); the type systems
for functional reactive programs (FRPs) developed by Krishnaswami (2013); the comonadic
approach to contextual computation developed by Orchard (2014); the explosive develop-
ments surrounding Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT), and the resulting interest in modalities
in cohesive HoTT (Shulman, 2018); and the very active research community centred around
guarded type theory (Clouston et al., 2016).
These developments have occurred in spite of the fact we lack an overarching founda-
tional understanding of modal proof theory. The major impediment to obtaining such a
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foundation is that the methods of modal proof theory are, at best, kaleidoscopic: some types
of calculi work well for certain logics, yet fail to encompass others. It is possible to develop
a working intuition for these patterns, but it is much harder to explain why a particular
pattern suits a particular modal logic.
In the sequel we propose an explanation that clarifies why the necessity fragments of
the most popular normal modal logics—namely K, T, K4, GL and S4—are best suited to
dual-context calculi, as pioneered by Girard (1993), Andreoli (1992), Wadler (1993, 1994),
Plotkin (1993), Barber (1996), and Pfenning and Davies (2001). The crux of the argument
is that separating assumptions into a modal zone and an intuitionistic zone allows one to
mimic rules from known cut-free sequent calculi for these logics.
Our investigation is structured as follows. We first define and discuss the the afore-
mentioned constructive modal logics, and present a Hilbert system for each (§2). Then, we
briefly revisit previous attempts at presenting calculi for them. This naturally leads us to
a systematic pattern for deriving dual context systems from cut-free sequent calculi, which
we show equivalent to the corresponding Hilbert systems (§3). We study the metatheory
of these calculi (§4), and a notion of reduction of terms which satisfies the usual properties,
and—modulo a few commuting conversions—the subformula property as well (§5).
Finally, we present a categorical semantics for these calculi (§6). The modalities are
interpreted by strong monoidal functors between cartesian categories (which we show to
be exactly the product preserving ones). The 4 and T axioms are interpreted by coherent
‘comultiplications’ and ‘counits’ for these functors. In the case of S4, which combines both
4 and T, these are required to satisfy the usual coherence required of a comonad. Finally,
GL requires a notion of modal fixed point, which is original to our investigation. These
categorical structures are shown to be sound and complete (§7).
Our contribution is twofold. On the theoretical side, it amounts to a full extension of
the Curry-Howard-Lambek isomorphism—based on the usual triptych of logic, computation
and categories—to a handful of modal logics. Indeed, only fragments of our dual-context
formulations have appeared before. Dual-context S4 was invented by Pfenning and Davies
(2001), who introduced these systems to modal logic; nevertheless, they did not study neither
reduction nor its semantics. An approach that is very similar to ours for K and K4 has been
considered by Pfenning (2013, 2015) in the context of linear sequent calculi. In turn, this
‘linear K’ of Pfenning seems to be closely related to the work of Danos and Joinet (2003)
in elementary linear logic. However, the intuitionistic, natural deduction formulation are
independently due to the present author, and the technical innovations needed in presenting
a term calculus for K4/GL are original. The only previous approach to GL was the rather
complicated natural deduction calculus of Bellin (1985), and the appreciably simpler dual-
context formulation is our own invention. Finally, the approach to T is new. The reader is
invited to consult the survey (Kavvos, 2016) for a more detailed history of modal λ-calculi.
On the other hand, the results in this paper are also meant to provide a solid foundation
for applications in programming languages. Necessity modalities are a way to control data
flow within a programming language. As such, a clear view of the landscape can help one
pick the appropriate modal axioms to ensure some desired correctness property.
For want of space, the present paper omits all straightforward proofs. The technical
report that contains them is available from the author.1 What is more, a large proportion
of the metatheory has been formalised in Agda; see the GitHub repository.2
1See the author’s website: www.lambdabetaeta.eu
2lambdabetaeta/modal-logics
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2. The logics in question
We will study the necessity fragment of five modal logics: constructive K (abbrv. CK), con-
structive K4 (abbrv. CK4), constructive T (abbrv. CT), constructive GL (abbrv. CGL), and
constructive S4 (abbrv. CS4). In this section we shall discuss the common characteristics
amongst these logics, define their syntax, and present a Hilbert system for each.
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2.1. Constructive modal logics. All of the above logics belong to a group of logics
that are broadly referred to as constructive modal logics. These are intuitionistic variants
of known modal logics which have been cherry-picked to satisfy a specific desideratum,
namely to have a well-behaved Gentzen-style proof-theoretic interpretation, and thereby an
associated computational interpretation through the Curry-Howard isomorphism.
There are a few characteristics common to all these logics, which are more appreciable
when the possibility modality (♦) is taken into consideration. First, the de Morgan duality
between necessity () and possibility (♦) breaks down, rendering those two modalities
logically independent. For that reason we shall mostly refer to the  as the box modality,
and ♦ as the diamond modality respectively. Second, the principles ♦(A∨B)→ ♦A∨♦B and
¬♦⊥ are not provable. These two principles are tautologies if we employ traditional Kripke
semantics (Kripke, 1963). Thus, the step to constructivity necessitates that we eschew the
Kripkean analysis, at least in its most popular form. But even if the diamond modality
is essential in pinpointing the salient differences between constructive modal logics and
other forms of intuitionistic modal logic—e.g. those studied by Simpson (1994)—it seems
that its computational interpretation is not very crisp. Hence, we restrict our study to the
better-behaved, and seemingly more applicable box modality (but see Pfenning (2001)).
As the history of modal proof theory and constructive modal logics is long and tumul-
tuous, we shall try to avoid the subject as much as possible. An extensive survey and
discussion of the history of constructive λ-calculi may be found in (Kavvos, 2016). For a
broader survey of the proof theory of modal logic we recommend (Negri, 2011).
2.2. Preliminaries. All of our modal logics shall be inductively defined sets of formulæ—
the theorems of the logic. These formulæ are generated by the following Backus-Naur form:
A,B ::= pi | ⊥ | A ∧B | A ∨B | A→ B | A
where pi is drawn from a countable set of propositions. The sets of theorems will be
generated by axioms, closed under some inference rules. The set of axioms will always
contain (a) all the instances the axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic, but over modal
formulæ (abbrv. IPL); and (b) all instances of the normality axiom, also known as axiom
K:
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
The set of inference rules will contain all instances of the two rules necessary to capture
IPL, namely the axiom rule:
A is an axiom of L
A ∈ L
and the rule of modus ponens:
(A→ B) ∈ L A ∈ L
B ∈ L
As for the modal part, we include all instances of the necessitation rule, namely
A ∈ L
A ∈ L
The only thing that will then vary between any two of our logics L will be the set of axioms.
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(assn)
Γ, A,∆ ⊢ A
A is an axiom
(ax)
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A→ B Γ ⊢ A
(MP )
Γ ⊢ B
⊢ A
(NEC)
Γ ⊢ A
Figure 1: Hilbert systems
2.3. Hilbert systems. There are two steps to passing from the definition of a logic to a
Hilbert system for it. First, we introduce a judgment of the form
Γ ⊢ A
where Γ is a context, i.e. a list of formulæ defined by the BNF
Γ ::= · | Γ, A
and A is a single formula. We shall use the comma to also denote concatenation—e.g.
Γ, A,∆ shall mean the concatenation of three things: the context Γ, the context consisting
of the single formula A, and the context ∆.
The judgment Γ ⊢ A is meant to be read as “from assumptions Γ, we infer A.” The
second step is to include the rules of axiom and modus ponens in this system. We also add
a rule that allows us to use an assumption; that is,
Γ, A,∆ ⊢ A
We need to be careful in adapting the rule of necessitation. Doing so in a straightforward
manner may invalidate the deduction theorem, which was a source of confusion in early work
on the proof theory of modal logic—see Hakli and Negri (2012) for a historical and technical
account. To approach this issue, we need to recall that necessitation is bears a likeness to
universal quantification: A is a theorem just if A is a theorem, and there is no reason
that this should be so if we need any assumptions to prove A. Thus, we should be able to
infer A (under any assumptions) only if we can infer A without any assumptions at all.
In symbols:
⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
The full system may be found in Figure 1.
2.4. Axioms. To obtain the various aforementioned logics, all we need to do is vary the
set of axioms. We write
(A1)⊕ · · · ⊕ (An)
to mean the set of theorems A such that ⊢ A is derivable from all instances of the axioms
(A1), . . . , (An) under the rules in Figure 1.
We write (IPL) to mean all instances of the axiom schemata of intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic, but also including formulas of the form A in the syntax. We will use the
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following axiom schemata:
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
(4) A→ A
(T) A→ A
(GL) (A→ A)→ A
Constructive K is then defined as the minimal normal constructive modal logic. Con-
structive K4 adds axiom 4 to that. Likewise, constructive T is the result of adding axiom
T to CK. Constructive S4 results from taking all these axiom schemas together. Finally,
we obtain constructive GL from CK by adding the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom GL. A summary in
symbols is in order:
CK
def
= (IPL)⊕ (K)
CK4
def
= (IPL)⊕ (K)⊕ (4)
CT
def
= (IPL)⊕ (K)⊕ (T)
CS4
def
= (IPL)⊕ (K)⊕ (4)⊕ (T)
CGL
def
= (IPL)⊕ (K)⊕ (GL)
To indicate that we are using the Hilbert system for e.g. CK, we annotate the turnstile,
like so:
Γ ⊢CK A
We simply write Γ ⊢ A or Γ ⊢H A when the statement under discussion pertains to all of
our Hilbert systems.
2.5. Metatheory for Hilbert.
2.5.1. Structural rules. We establish the following basic facts about all our logics:
Theorem 2.1 (Structural & Cut). The following rules are admissible.3
(1) (Weakening)
Γ ⊢ C
Γ, A ⊢ C
(2) (Exchange)
Γ, A,B,∆ ⊢ C
Γ, B,A,∆ ⊢ C
(3) (Contraction)
Γ, A,A,∆ ⊢ C
Γ, A,∆ ⊢ C
(4) (Cut)
Γ ⊢ A Γ, A,∆ ⊢ C
Γ,∆ ⊢ C
Proof. All by induction.
3Recall that a rule is admissible just if the existence of a proof of the antecedent implies the existence
of a proof of the conclusion. In contrast, a rule is derivable just if a proof of the antecedent can be used
verbatim as a constituent part of a proof of the conclusion.
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Theorem 2.2 (Deduction Theorem). The following rule is admissible in all of our logics:
Γ, A ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A→ B
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ, A ⊢ B.
2.5.2. Admissible Rules. We now consider some rules that are admissible in our Hilbert
systems. These will prove useful when we tackle the equivalence of the Hilbert systems
with the dual-context systems.
The first one is Scott’s rule, which ensures that if we ‘box’ all our assumptions, we can
get something ‘boxed’ in return. Categorically, we shall see that Scott’s rule will express the
fact that the box modality is a functor, and that this functor is monoidal with respect to the
cartesian product. We write Γ to mean the context Γ which each assumption occurring
in it boxed, i.e.
(A1, . . . , An)
def
= A1, . . . ,An
Theorem 2.3 (Admissibility of Scott’s rule). The following rule is admissible in all of our
logics:
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
Proof. Induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ A. Most cases are straightforward, except perhaps
the one for modus ponens. If the last step in the derivation of Γ ⊢ A is of the form
·
·
·
Γ ⊢ B → A
·
·
·
Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A
then, by applying the induction hypotheses to the two subderivations, we obtain proofs of
Γ ⊢  (B → A) and Γ ⊢ B. We can then use axiom K and use modus ponens twice to
build the desired proof, like so:
Γ ⊢ (B → A)→ B → A
·
·
·
Γ ⊢ (B → A)
Γ ⊢ B → A
·
·
·
Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A
Next, we deal with a rule that is only derivable if the system contains the axiom T. The
gist of the rule is that A is stronger than A, as it implies it in any context.
Theorem 2.4 (Admissibility of the T Rule). If L is a logic that includes the T axiom, i.e.
if L ∈ {CT,CS4}, then the following rule is admissible:
Γ ⊢L A
Γ ⊢L A
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ A. All the cases are straightforward, except
the assumption rule. If Γ ⊢ A because A occurs in Γ, then Γ ⊢ A, and using modus
ponens along with an instance of axiom T yields the result.
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Finally, we present a rule that we call the Four rule. As its name suggests, the Four
rule deductively encapsulates the inclusion of axiom 4. In a nutshell, it expresses the fact
that, if something is derivable from A, then it is derivable from A itself: that is, one
can ‘cut’ with axiom 4.
The Four rule only pertains to logics that include all instances of 4. One of these logics
is CGL, but in that case 4 is a theorem, so we begin by deriving it:
Lemma 2.5. ⊢CGL A→ A
Proof. We follow Boolos (1994). By using one of the conjunction axioms of (IPL) and
Scott’s rule, we have (A ∧A) ⊢ A, and hence
A,(A ∧A) ⊢ A ∧A
again by using weakening and the one of the conjunction axioms. Then, the deduction
theorem and Scott’s rule yield that
A ⊢  ( (A ∧A)→ A ∧A)
Using that alongside modus ponens and the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom yields
A ⊢  (A ∧A)
and ‘cutting’ with  (A ∧A) ⊢ A and using the deduction theorem completes the
proof.
Thus:
Theorem 2.6 (Admissibility of the Four Rule). If L is a logic that includes 4 either as
axiom or as theorem, i.e. if L ∈ {CK4,CGL,CS4}, then the following rule is admissible:
Γ,Γ ⊢L A
Γ ⊢L A
Proof. Induction on the derivation of Γ,Γ ⊢ A. Most cases are straightforward: it suf-
fices to use necessitation. The case for modus ponens uses axiom K: see the proof of the
admissibility of Scott’s rule (Theorem 2.3) for more details.
This leaves the case where Γ,Γ ⊢ A by the assumption rule. It follows that A either
occurs in Γ, or it occurs in Γ. If it occurs in Γ, then it is of the form A′; thus Γ ⊢ A′,
and using modus ponens alongside an instance of axiom 4 yields Γ ⊢ A′ = A. If, on
the other hand, A occurs in Γ, then Γ ⊢ A by the assumption rule, and we are done.
A slightly weaker variant of the Four rule appears in (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000). It
is a corollary to ours:
Corollary 2.7. If L is a logic that includes 4 either as axiom or as theorem, i.e. if
L ∈ {CK4,CGL,CS4}, then the following rule is admissible:
Γ ⊢L A
Γ ⊢L A
Proof. Use weakening and the Four rule.
If the T rule is admissible as well—i.e. in the case of CS4—we can derive the theorem
from the corollary. If Γ,Γ ⊢ A, then Γ,Γ ⊢ A by the T rule, and repeatedly cutting
with instances of B ⊢ B yieldsΓ,Γ ⊢ A. Repeated uses of exchange and contraction
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then show Γ ⊢ A, to which we apply the corollary. However, if the axiom T is not present
and Rule T is not admissible, we need the stronger version.
Finally, we show that Lo¨b’s rule is admissible in CGL. Again, we show a stronger
version:
Theorem 2.8 (Lo¨b’s Rule). The following rule is admissible in CGL:
Γ,Γ,A ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
Proof. By the deduction theorem, we can infer that Γ,Γ ⊢ A → A, and hence by the
Four rule (Theorem 2.6), it follows that
Γ ⊢ (A→ A)
Using an instance of the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom and modus ponens completes the proof.
Again, we have a corollary that is weaker but corresponds to what is normally referred to
as Lo¨b’s rule:
Corollary 2.9. The following rule is admissible in CGL:
Γ,A ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
Proof. Use weakening and Lo¨b’s rule.
3. From sequent calculi to dual contexts
In this section we discuss the issues that one has to tackle time and time again whilst
devising modal λ-calculi for necessity modalities.
3.1. The perennial issues. A brief perusal of the survey (Kavvos, 2016) indicates that
most work in the subject is concentrated on essentially two kinds of calculi: (a) those with
explicit substitutions, following a style that was popularised by Bierman and de Paiva (1992,
1996, 2000); and (b) those employing dual contexts, a pattern that was imported into modal
type theory by (Davies and Pfenning, 1996, 2001) and (Pfenning and Davies, 2001).
3.1.1. Explicit substitutions a` la Bierman & de Paiva. The calculus introduced by Bierman
and de Paiva made use of a trick that was previously employed in the context of Intuitionistic
Linear Logic by Benton et al. (1993) to ensure that substitution is admissible. The trick is
simple: if cut is not admissible, then build it into the introduction rule.
In the case of CS4 (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000), the resulting λ-calculus is an exten-
sion of the ordinary simply typed λ-calculus, obtained by adding the following introduction
rule:
Γ ⊢M1 : A1 . . . Γ ⊢Mn : An x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ⊢ N : B
Γ ⊢ box N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . xn : B
In this example, x1, . . . xn comprise all the free variables that may occur in N . They must
all be ‘modal,’ in that their type has to start with a box. But if we are to place a box in
front of B then we must provide a substitute Mi for each of these free variables, and Mi
must also be of modal type. In short: all the data that goes into the making of something
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of type B must be ‘boxed.’ And, as if that were not enough, all these terms of type Ai
must be provided at once, for they are ‘frozen’ as part of the term of type B: they become
an explicit substitution in the syntax. This is a combined introduction and cut rule: the
introduction part ensures that modal data depend only on modal data, and the cut part
allows for substitution.
By comparison, the elimination rule is much simpler, and incorporates axiom T (A→
A):
Γ ⊢M : A
Γ ⊢ unboxM : A
In order to ensure admissibility of cut and hence subject reduction, the β-rule associated
with these rules has the effect of unrolling the explicit substitutions en masse:
unbox (box N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . xn) −→ N [M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn]
Calculi of this sort are notorious for suffering from two kinds of problems: (a) their
need for multiple commuting conversions, and (b) the lack of ‘good’ symmetries in the rules
of the calculus. These two aspects we shall discuss in turn.
Commuting Conversions: In order to maintain the validity of central proof-theoretic
results, calculi with explicit subsitutions often need a large number of commuting con-
versions. Amongst other things, these conversions expose ‘hidden’ redexes, the existence
of which spoil the so-called subformula property, which we will discuss in §5.4. The issue
of commuting conversions is known to arise from rules for positive connectives, such
as those for disjunction and existence; for a particularly perspicuous discussion, see
(Girard et al., 1989, §10.1).
In calculi such as the above, commuting conversions are invariably some kind of
structural rule concerning the explicit substitutions. Structural rules are traditionally
found in sequent calculi, but not in natural deduction where they are often admissible.
Their presence in a natural deduction system is incompatible with the view that natural
deduction proofs comprise the “real proof objects”—see (Girard et al., 1989, §5.4). In
the case of Bierman and de Paiva’s system for CS4, Goubault-Larrecq (1996) argues
that systems like it obscure the computational meaning of modal proofs: if they didn’t,
they would need no structural rules at all.
‘Good’ symmetries: The calculus of Bierman and de Paiva for CS4 exhibits reasonable
symmetries: if we forget about the explicit substitutions for a moment, then we can see
an introduction and an elimination rule, the latter post-inverse to the former: there is
reasonable harmony.
Things are not that simple when it comes to other calculi of this sort. To see that,
we look at the the calculus of Bellin et al. (2001) for CK. Its introduction rule is only
slightly different to the one for CS4, in that the free variables need not be of modal type.
However, the substitutes for these free variables must be of modal type. To wit:
Γ ⊢M1 : A1 . . . Γ ⊢Mn : An x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ⊢ N : B
Γ ⊢ box N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . xn : B
In this calculus there can be no harmony, for there is no elimination rule at all. Indeed,
the only plausible ‘β-rule’ one might adopt is actually just a commuting conversion that
was previously studied in the context of CS4 by Goubault-Larrecq (1996). Its function
is to unbox any ‘canonical’ terms in the explicit substitutions; e.g
box yx with y, (box M with z for z) for y, x −→ box y(boxM) with y, z for y, z
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in an appropriate context for y and z. It is evident that once we step out of the
harmonious patterns of CS4, systems based on ‘mixed’ introduction rules with explicit
subsitutions becomes less and less tenable.
In order to reach a better solution we must overcome two problems: (a) we must ‘decou-
ple’ the two flavours—introduction and cut—that together constitute the introduction rules
of this shape; and (b) we must minimize as much as possible the commuting conversions—in
particular, we should strive to make them free of any computational content. We should
nevertheless expect that to do so one might have to sacrifice the apparent simplicity of this
kind of system.
3.1.2. Dual contexts. The right intuition for achieving this decoupling was introduced by
Girard (1993) in his attempt to combine classical, intuitionistic, and linear logic in one sys-
tem, and also independently by Andreoli (1992) in the context of linear logic programming.
The idea is simple and can be turned into a slogan: segregate assumptions. This means
that we should divide our usual context of assumptions in two, or—even better—think
of it as consisting of two zones. We should think of one zone as the primary zone, and
the assumptions occuring in it as the ‘ordinary’ sort of assumptions. The other zone is
the secondary zone, and the assumptions in it normally have a different flavour. In this
context, the introduction rule explains the interaction between the two contexts, whereas
the elimination rule effects substitution for the secondary context.
This idea has been most profitable in the case of the Dual Intuitionistic Linear Logic
(DILL) of Barber (1996) and Plotkin (1993), where the primary context consists of linear
assumptions, and the secondary consists of ‘ordinary’ intuitionstic assumptions. The ‘of
course’ modality (!) of Linear Logic is very much like a S4 modality, and—simply by lifting
the linearity restrictions—(Pfenning and Davies, 2001; Davies and Pfenning, 2001) adapted
this work to the modal logic CS4 with considerable success. In this system, hereafter
referred to as Dual Constructive S4 (DS4), the primary context consists of intuitionistic
assumptions, whereas the secondary context consists of modal assumptions.
The systems of Barber, Plotkin, Davies and Pfenning do not immediately seem adapt-
able to other logics. Indeed, the pattern may at first seem limited to modalities like
‘of course’ and the necessity of S4, which—categorically—are comonads. Recall that a
comonad can be decomposed into an adjunction, which comes with a universal property,
and it may seem that the syntax heavily depends on that.
In the rest of this section we argue that, not only does the dual-context pattern not
depend on this universal property, but also that it can easily be adapted to capture the
necessity fragments of all the other aforementioned logics.
3.2. Deriving dual-context calculi. We shall start with the usual suspect, namely the
sequent calculus. Gentzen introduced the sequent calculus in the 1930s (Gentzen, 1935a,b)
in order to study normalisation of proofs, known as cut elimination in this context; see
Girard et al. (1989) for an introduction.
A proof in the sequent calculus consists of a tree of sequents, which take the form Γ ⊢ A,
where Γ is a context. Thus in our notation a sequent is a different name for a judgment, like
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the ones in natural deduction.4 The rules, however, are different: they come in two flavours:
left rules and right rules. Broadly speaking, right rules are exactly the introduction rules
of natural deduction, as they only concern the conclusion A of the sequent. The left rules
play a role similar to that of elimination rules, but they do so by ‘gerrymandering’ with
the assumptions in Γ. See (Girard et al., 1989, §5.4) for a more in-depth discussion of the
correspondence between natural deduction and sequent calculus.
The first attempts to forge sequent calculi for modal logics began in the 1950s, with
the formulation of a sequent calculus for S4 by Curry (1952) and Ohnisi and Matsumoto
(1957, 1959). There was also some limited success for other simple modal logics, mainly
involving the axioms we discuss here. Most of these are mentioned by Ono (1998) and are
more thoroughly discussed in the survey (Wansing, 2002); see also (Negri, 2011).
3.2.1. The Introduction Rules. Let us consider the right rule for the logic S4. In the intu-
itionistic case, the rule is
Γ ⊢ A
(R)
Γ ⊢ A
One cannot help but notice this rule has an intuitive computational interpretation, in terms
of ‘flow of data.’ We can read it as follows: if only modal data are used in inferring A, then
we may safely obtain A. Only ‘boxed’ things can flow into something that is ‘boxed’ (cf.
§3.1.1).
Let us now take a closer look at dual-context systems for box modalities. A dual-context
judgment is of the form
∆ ; Γ ⊢ A
where both ∆ and Γ are contexts. The assumptions in ∆ are to be thought of as modal,
whereas the assumptions in Γ are run-of-the-mill intuitionistic assumptions. A loose trans-
lation of a judgment of this form to the ‘ordinary sort’ would be
∆ ; Γ ⊢ A  ∆,Γ ⊢ A
Under this translation, if we ‘mimic’ the right rule for S4 we would obtain the following:
∆ ; · ⊢ A
∆ ; · ⊢ A
where · denotes the empty context. However, natural deduction systems do not have any
structural rules, so we have to include some kind of ‘opportunity to weaken the context’ in
the above rule. If we do so, the result is
∆ ; · ⊢ A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ A
Under the translation described above, this is exactly the right rule for S4, with some extra
weakening included. Incidentally, it is also exactly the introduction rule of Pfenning and Davies
(2001) for their dual-context system DS4.
This pattern can be harvested to turn the right rules for the box in sequent calculi into
introduction rules in dual-context systems. We tackle each case separately, except T, which
we discuss in §3.2.6.
4Fundamental differences arise in the case of classical logics, where sequents are of the form Γ ⊢ ∆
where both Γ and ∆ are lists of formulae. For the purposes of intuitionistic logic ∆ consists of at most one
formula—see (Girard et al., 1989, §5.1.3).
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3.2.2. K. The case for K is slightly harder to fathom at first sight. This is because its
sequent only has a single rule for the modality, namely Scott’s rule:
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
As Bellin et al. (2001) discuss, this rule is unsavoury: it is both a left and a right rule at
the same time. It cannot be split into two rules, which is the pattern that bestows sequent
calculus its fundamental symmetries.
Despite this, Scott’s rule is reasonably well-behaved. Leivant (1981) and Valentini
(1982) showed that incorporating Scott’s rule yields a system which admits cut elimination.
Scott’s rule also appears in the sequent calculus for CK studied by Wijesekera (1990).
With the previous interpretation in mind, our introduction rule should take the follow-
ing form:
· ; ∆ ⊢ A
∆ ; · ⊢ A
Indeed, we emulate Scott’s rule by ensuring that all the intuitionistic assumptions must
become modal, at once. The final form is reached again by adding opportunities for weak-
ening:
· ; ∆ ⊢ A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ A
At this point, the reader may protest vehemently, arguing that this is not an intro-
duction rule in the spirit of natural deduction at all: we are shamelessly messing with
assumptions! So much is true. But it is also true that even the most well-behaved frag-
ments of natural deduction are not really trees, but involve some ‘back edges,’ e.g. to record
when and which assumptions are discharged—see (Girard et al., 1989, §2.1). The situation
is even more involved when it comes to the not-so-well-behaving positive fragment (∨∃): for
example, elimination rule for ∨, namely
Γ ⊢ A ∨B Γ, A ⊢ C Γ, B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ C
involves the silent elimination of two ‘temporary assumptions,’ A and B. Rules involving
such temporary assumptions have been of enough importance to warrant their own name:
they are known as rules ‘in the style’ of Schroeder-Heister (1984). The sum of it all is this:
the proofs were never really trees.
Consequently, our shameless shuffling of assumptions from one context to another shall
not weigh heavily on our conscience. In fact, there is a simple way to think about the
‘jump’ that the context ∆ makes from intuitionistic to modal. Suppose that we are in the
process of writing down an ordinary deduction, and we want to introduce a box in front of
the conclusion. All we have to do, then, is to place a mark on all the assumptions that are
open at that point. This does not discharge them, but it merely makes them modal: there
shall be a fundamentally different way of substiting for them, and it shall be a little more
complicated than the simple splicing of a proof tree at a leaf.5
5In fact, in order to substitute, we will need to ensure that (a) the substitute must have no modal
assumptions at all, and (b) after substitution, we need to mark all the assumptions of that substitute as
modal. But we leave that for later.
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3.2.3. K4. The right sequent calculus rule for the logic K4, as well as the proof of cut
elimination, is due to Sambin and Valentini (1982). Using elements from his joint work
with Sambin, as well some counterexamples found in the work of Leivant (1981) on GL,
Valentini noticed that the key property induced by axiom 4 is that anything derivable
by A is derivable by A. The following (left-and-right) rule for the encapsulates this
insight:
Γ,Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
Thus, to derive A from a bunch of boxed assumptions, it suffices to derive A from two
copies of the same assumptions, one boxed and one unboxed. This co-occurence of the same
assumptions in two forms will cause some mild technical complications in the next section,
but that will clarify the structure of the ‘flow of data’ in K4.
A direct translation, after adding opportunities for weakening, amounts to the intro-
duction rule:
∆ ; ∆ ⊢ A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ A
3.2.4. GL. The correct formulation of sequent calculus for GL is a difficult problem that
receives attention time and time again. There are simple solutions that guarantee that we
can derive all and only theorems of GL, but they fail to satisfy cut elimination. There is
also a very complicated system of natural deduction, due to Bellin (1985).
The first attempt at a cut-free sequent calculus was that of Leivant (1981). Soon
thereafter Valentini (1983) showed that Leivant’s proof of cut elimination was incorrect.
Sambin and Valentini (1980) describe a procedure for building cut-free proofs for all prov-
able sequents, but their proof is semantic and goes through Kripke structures, and hence
does not constitute Gentzen-style cut elimination. Sambin and Valentini (1982) collect and
describe in detail many early approaches, the reasons they do or do not work, and all rele-
vant results. Finally, Valentini (1983) shows that the same rule admits cut elimination, but
the proof is rather complicated, and derives from ideas of (Bellin, 1985). Recent progress
on clarifying that result may be found in Gore´ and Ramanayke (2012).
The Leivant-Valentini sequent calculus rule for GL is the following:
Γ,Γ,A ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
The only difference between this rule and the one for K4 is the appearance of the ‘diagonal
assumption’ A. We can straightforwardly use our translation to state it as an introduction
rule:
∆ ; ∆,A ⊢ A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ A
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3.2.5. The Elimination Rule. As discussed in §3.1.2, in a dual-context calculus we consider
one of these zones to be primary, and the other secondary, depending of course on our
intentions. Assumptions in the primary zone are discharged by λ-abstraction. Thus, the
function space of DILL is linear, whereas the function space of DS4 is intuitionistic. This
mechanism provides for internal substitution for an assumption, by first λ-abstracting it
and then applying the resulting function to an argument.
In contrast, substituting for assumptions in the secondary zone is the capacity of the
elimination rule. This is a customary pattern for dual-context calculi: unlike primary
assumptions, substitution for secondary assumptions is essentially a cut rule. In the term
assignment system we will consider later, this takes the form of an explicit substitution, a
type of ‘let construct.’ The rationale is this: the rest of the system controls how secondary
assumptions arise and are used, and the elimination rule uniformly allows one to substitute
for them.6 To wit:
∆ ; Γ ⊢ A ∆, A ; Γ ⊢ C
(E)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ C
A lot of cheek is involved in trying to pass a cut rule as an elimination rule. Notwithstanding
the hypocrisy, this is not only common, but also the best presently known solution to
regaining the patterns of introduction/elimination in the presence of modality. It is the
core of our second slogan: in dual context systems, substitution is a cut rule for secondary
assumptions.
One cannot help but notice that such rules are also in the infamous style of Schroeder-Heister
(1984), and very similar to that for disjunction. This kind of rule is known to be problematic,
as it automatically necessitates some commuting conversions: unavoidably, the conclusion
C has no structural relationship with anything else in sight. See (Girard et al., 1989, §10)
for a more in-depth discussion.
Can we live with this? Unless we are to engage in more complicated and radical schemes,
the present author is afraid that we must. Put simply, there is no good way to do away with
commuting conversions: they are part-and-parcel of any sufficiently complicated type theory.
All we can hope for is to (a) minimize their number, and (b) state them systematically.
3.2.6. A second variable rule. We have conveniently avoided discussing two things up to
this point: (a) the left rule for  in S4, which is the only one of our logics that has both
left and right rules, and (b) the case of T. These two are intimately related.
The left rule for necessity in S4 is
Γ, A ⊢ B
(L)
Γ,A ⊢ B
We can intuitively read it as follows: if A suffices to infer B, then A is more than enough
to infer B. It is not hard to see that this encapsulates the T axiom, namely A→ A. This
rule, together with Scott’s rule, forms a sequent calculus where cut is admissible; this is
mentioned by Wansing (2002) and attributed to Ohnisi and Matsumoto (1957).
One way of emulating this rule in our framework would be to have a construct that
makes an assumption ‘jump’ from one context to another, but that is inelegant and probably
unworkable. We are in natural deduction, and we have two kinds of assumptions: modal
6Alternative approaches have also been considered. For example, one could introduce another abstraction
operator, i.e. a ‘modal λ.’ This has been adopted by Pfenning (2001) in a dependently-typed setting.
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and intuitionistic. The way to imitate the following is to include a rule that allows one to
use a modal assumption as if it were merely intuitionistic. To wit:
(var)
∆, A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢ A
This translates back to the sequent ∆,A,∆′,Γ ⊢ A.
A rule like this was introduced by Plotkin (1993) and Barber (1996) for dereliction
in DILL, and is also essential in Davies and Pfenning’s DS4. In our case, we use it in
combination with the introduction rule for K in order to make a system for T.
4. Types, terms, and metatheory
In this section we collect all the observations we made in §3 in order to turn our natural
deduction systems into term assignment systems, i.e. typed λ-calculi. First, we annotate
each assumption A with a variable, e.g. x : A. Then, we annotate each judgment ∆ ;
Γ ⊢ A with a term M representing the entire deduction that with that judgment as its
conclusion—see (Girard et al., 1989, §3) or (Gallier, 1993; Sørensen and Urzyczyn, 2006)
for an introduction. We omit a treatment of ∨, for we believe it is largely orthogonal.
The grammars defining types, terms and contexts, as well as the typing rules for all
our systems can be found in Figure 2. When we are at risk of confusion, we annotate the
turnstile with a subscript to indicate which system we are referring to; e.g. ∆ ;Γ ⊢GL M : A
refers to the system consisting of the rules pertaining to all our calculi coupled with the
introduction rule (IGL).
We also define
ΛA
def
= {M | ∃∆,Γ. ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A }
to be the set of terms of type A, and we write Λ for the set of all terms, well-typed or not.
From this point onwards, we assume Barendregt’s conventions: terms are identified by
α-conversion, and bound variables are silently renamed whenever necessary. In let box u⇐
M in N , u is a bound variable in N . Finally, we write N [M/x] to mean capture-avoiding
substitution of M for x in N .
Furthermore, we shall assume that whenever we write a judgment like ∆ ; Γ ⊢ M : A,
then ∆ and Γ are disjoint, in the sense that Vars (∆) ∩Vars (Γ) = ∅, where
Vars (x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An)
def
= {x1, . . . , xn}
This causes a mild technical complication in the cases K4 and GL. Fortunately, the solution
is relatively simple, and we explain it now.
4.1. Complementary variables. Na¨ıvely annotating the rule for K4 would yield
∆ ; ∆ ⊢M : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : A
This, however, violates our convention that the two contexts are disjoint: the same variables
will appear both at modal and intuitionistic positions. To overcome this we introduce the
notion of complementary variables. Let V be the set of term variables for our calculi. A
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Types A,B ::= pi | A×B | A→ B | A
Typing Contexts Γ,∆ ::= · | Γ, x:A
Terms M,N ::= x | λx:A. M |MN | 〈M,N〉 | π1(M) | π2(M)
| box M | let box u⇐M in N
Rules for all calculi:
(var)
∆ ; Γ, x:A,Γ′ ⊢ x : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : B
(×I)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ 〈M,N〉 : A×B
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A1 ×A2
(×Ei)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ πi (M) : Ai
∆ ; Γ, x:A ⊢M : B
(→ I)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ λx:A. M : A→ B
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A→ B ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : A
(→ E)
∆ ; Γ ⊢MN : B
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : C
(E)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N : C
Rules for K, K4, GL:
· ; ∆ ⊢M : A
(IK)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : A
∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢M⊥ : A
(IK4)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : A
∆ ; ∆⊥, z⊥ : A ⊢M⊥ : A
(IGL)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ fix z in box M : A
Rules for S4:
(var)
∆, u:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢ u : A
∆ ; · ⊢M : A
(IS4)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : A
Rules for T: (IK) and (var)
Figure 2: Definition and Typing Judgments
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complementation function is an involution on variables. That is, it is a bijection (−)⊥ :
V
∼=
−→ V which happens to be its own inverse:(
x⊥
)⊥
= x
The idea is that, if u is the modal variable representing some assumption in ∆, we will write
u⊥ to refer to a variable x, uniquely associated to u, and representing the same assumption,
but without a box in front. For technical reasons, we would like that x⊥ be the same
variable as u.
We extend the involution to contexts:
(x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An)
⊥ def= x⊥1 : A1, . . . , x
⊥
n : An
We also inductively extend (−)⊥ to terms, with the exception that it must not change
anything inside a box (−) construct. It also need not change any bound modal variables, as
for K4 and GL these shall only occur under box (−) constructs:
(λx : A.M)⊥
def
= λx⊥:A. M⊥
(MN)⊥
def
=M⊥N⊥
〈M,N〉
def
= 〈M⊥, N⊥〉
(πi(M))
⊥ def= πi(M
⊥)
(box M)⊥
def
= box M
(let box u⇐M in N)⊥
def
= let box u⇐M⊥ in N⊥
We use this machinery to modify the rule, so as to maintain disjoint contexts. When we
encounter an introduction rule for the box and the context ∆ gets ‘copied’ to the intuition-
istic position, we will complement all variables in the copy, as well as all variables occuring
in M , but not under any box (−) constructs:
∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢M⊥ : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : A
As an example, here is the derivation that · ;A ⊢ (A ∧A):
· ; x : A ⊢ x : A
u : A ; u⊥ : A ⊢ u⊥ : A
u : A ; u⊥ : A ⊢ u⊥ : A
u : A ; u⊥ : A ⊢ box u : A
u : A ; u⊥ : A ⊢ 〈u⊥, box u〉 : A×A
u : A ; x : A ⊢ box 〈u, box u〉 : (A×A)
· ; x : A ⊢ let box u⇐ x in box 〈u, box u〉 : (A×A)
We extend complementation to finite sets of variables, by setting
{x1, . . . , xn}
def
= x⊥1 , . . . , x
⊥
n
It is not hard to see that (a) the involutive behaviour of (−)⊥ extends to all these extensions
and (b) some common operations commute with (−)⊥.
Lemma 4.1.
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(1) For any context ∆,
(
∆⊥
)⊥
≡ ∆.
(2) For any finite set of variabels S,
(
S⊥
)⊥
= S.
(3) For any context ∆, Vars
(
∆⊥
)
= (Vars (∆))⊥.
(4) If S, T are finite sets of variables, then
S ⊆ T =⇒ S⊥ ⊆ T⊥
Proof. Trivial.
There is a simple relationship between complementation and substitution:
Theorem 4.2. If u⊥ is not free in M , then
(M [N/u])⊥ ≡M⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥]
Proof. By induction on M .
(1) If M is a variable, then by assumption M 6≡ u⊥. There are then two cases:
(a) M ≡ u: then
(M [N/u])⊥ ≡ N⊥ ≡ u⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥] ≡M⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥]
(b) M ≡ v 6≡ u, u⊥: then
(M [N/u])⊥ ≡ v⊥ ≡ v⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥] ≡M⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥]
(2) If M ≡ λx:A.M ′, then, assuming x 6≡ u, u⊥, we use the IH to calculate that
(M [N/u])⊥ ≡ λx⊥.(M ′[N/u])⊥ ≡ λx⊥.M ′⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥] ≡ (λx.M ′)⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥]
(3) If M is an application M1M2 or a tuple 〈M1,M2〉, we use the IH twice. Similarly if it
is a projection πi(M
′).
(4) If M ≡ box M ′, we calculate:
(M [N/u])⊥ ≡
(
box (M ′[N/u])
)⊥
≡ box (M ′[N/u]) ≡ (box M ′)⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥]
where the last step follows because box M ′ ≡ (box M ′)⊥, and u⊥ 6∈ fv (M ′).
(5) If M ≡ let box v ⇐M1 in M2, we calculate
(M [N/u])⊥ ≡ let box v ⇐ (M1[N/u])
⊥
in (M2[N/u])
⊥
≡ let box v ⇐M⊥1 [N,N
⊥/u, u⊥] in M⊥2 [N,N
⊥/u, u⊥]
≡
(
let box v ⇐M⊥1 in M
⊥
2
)
[N,N⊥/u, u⊥]
≡M⊥[N,N⊥/u, u⊥]
To conclude our discussion of complementary variables, we carefully define what it
means for a pair of contexts to be well-defined.
Definition 1 (Well-defined contexts). A pair of contexts ∆ ; Γ is well-defined just if
(1) They are disjoint, i.e. Vars (∆) ∩Vars (Γ) = ∅.
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(2) In the cases of K4 and GL, no two complementary variables occur in the same context;
that is
Vars (Γ) ∩Vars
(
Γ⊥
)
= ∅
Vars (∆) ∩Vars
(
∆⊥
)
= ∅
The second condition is easy to enforce, and will prove useful in some technical results found
in the sequel.
4.2. Free variables: boxed and unboxed.
Definition 2 (Free variables).
(1) The free variables fv (M) of a term M are defined by induction on the structure of the
term:
fv (x)
def
= {x}
fv (MN)
def
= fv (M) ∪ fv (N)
fv (λx:A. M)
def
= fv (M)− {x}
fv (〈M,N〉)
def
= fv (M) ∪ fv (N)
fv (πi(M))
def
= fv (M)
fv (box M)
def
= fv (M)
fv (let box u⇐M in N)
def
= fv (M) ∪ (fv (N)− {u})
and for GL we replace the clause for box (−) with
fv (fix z in box M)
def
= fv (M)− {z}
(2) The unboxed free variables fv0 (M) of a term are those that do not occur under the
scope of a box (−) construct. They are formally defined by replacing the clause for
box (−) in the definition of free variables by
fv0 (box M)
def
= ∅
and, for GL,
fv0 (fix z in box M)
def
= ∅
(3) The boxed free variables fv≥1 (M) of a term M are those that do occur under the scope
of a box (−) construct. They are formally defined by replacing the clauses for variables
and for box (−) in the definition of free variables by the following
fv≥1 (x)
def
= ∅
fv≥1 (box M)
def
= fv (M)
and, for GL,
fv≥1 (fix z in box M)
def
= fv (M)− {z}
Theorem 4.3 (Free variables).
(1) For every term M , fv (M) = fv0 (M) ∪ fv≥1 (M).
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(2) For every term M , fv0
(
M⊥
)
= fv0 (M)
⊥.
(3) For every term M , fv≥1
(
M⊥
)
= fv≥1 (M).
(4) If S ∈ {DK,DK4,DGL} and ∆ ; Γ ⊢S M : A, then
fv0 (M) ⊆ Vars (Γ)
fv≥1 (M) ⊆ Vars (∆)
(5) If S ∈ {DS4,DT} and ∆ ; Γ ⊢S M : A, then
fv0 (M) ⊆ Vars (Γ) ∪Vars (∆)
fv≥1 (M) ⊆ Vars (∆)
(6) If ∆ ; Γ, x:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A and x 6∈ fv (M), then ∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢M : A.
(7) If ∆, u:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A and u 6∈ fv (M), then ∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A.
4.3. Structural theorems. As expected, our systems satisfy the standard menu of struc-
tural results: weakening, contraction, exchange, and cut rules are admissible.
Theorem 4.4 (Structural & Cut). The following rules are admissible in all systems:
(1) (Weakening)
∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢M : A
∆ ; Γ, x:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A
(2) (Exchange)
∆ ; Γ, x:A, y:B,Γ′ ⊢M : C
∆ ; Γ, y:B,x:A,Γ′ ⊢M : C
(3) (Contraction)
∆ ; Γ, x:A, y:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A
∆ ; Γ, w:A,Γ′ ⊢M [w,w/x, y] : A
(4) (Cut)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : A ∆ ; Γ, x:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A
∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢M [N/x] : A
Proof. All by induction on the typing derivation of M . Most cases are standard. As an
example, we show the case of (IK) for weakening. Suppose ∆ ; Γ,Γ
′ ⊢ M : A by (IK).
Then M ≡ box M ′ and A ≡ A′ and · ; ∆ ⊢ M ′ : A′. A single use of (IK) then yields
∆ ; Γ, x:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A.
Theorem 4.5 (Modal Structural). The following rules are admissible:
(1) (Modal Weakening)
∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : C
∆, u:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : C
(2) (Modal Exchange)
∆, x:A, y:B,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : C
∆, y:B,x:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : C
(3) (Modal Contraction)
∆, x:A, y:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : C
∆, w:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M [w,w/x, y] : C
Theorem 4.6 (Modal Cut). The following rules are admissible:
(1) (Modal Cut for DK)
· ; ∆ ⊢DK N : A ∆, u:A,∆
′ ; Γ ⊢DK M : C
∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢DK M [N/u] : C
22 G. A. KAVVOS
(2) (Modal Cut for DK4)
∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢DK4 N
⊥ : A ∆, u:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢DK4 M : C
∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢DK4 M [N/u] : C
(3) (Modal Cut for DGL)
∆ ; ∆⊥, z⊥ : A ⊢DGL N
⊥ : A ∆, u:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢DGL M : C
∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢DGL M [N [fix z in box N/z] /u] : C
(4) (Modal Cut for DS4)
∆ ; · ⊢DS4 N : A ∆, u:A,∆
′ ; Γ ⊢DS4 M : C
∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢DS4 M [N/u] : C
(5) (Modal Cut for DT)
· ; ∆ ⊢DT N : A ∆, u:A,∆
′ ; Γ ⊢DT M : C
∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢DT M [N/u] : C
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation of M .
Finally, in the cases where the T axiom is present, we may move variables from the
intuitionstic to the modal context:
Theorem 4.7 (Modal Dereliction). If S ∈ {DS4,DT}, then the following rule is admissible:
∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢M : A
∆,Γ ; Γ′ ⊢M : A
4.4. Equivalence between Hilbert and dual systems. In this section we prove that
our dual-context λ-calculi correspond to the negative fragment of the Hilbert systems for
the logics we defined in §2. An extension to the full fragment should be straightforward.
This ties the knot with respect to the Curry-Howard isomorphism.
The translation under which this equivalence is shown is indeed the same one that we
used in §3 to derive our calculi:
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A  ∆ˆ, Γˆ ⊢H A
The only differences are that the proof term M is now visible, and we write Γˆ to mean the
context Γ with all the variables removed: if Γ ≡ x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, then
Γˆ
def
= A1, . . . , An
One direction of the proof involves showing that the axioms are indeed derivable in
the dual-context systems. The other direction involves showing the admissibility of the
dual-context rules in the Hilbert systems.
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4.4.1. Hilbert to Dual. First and foremost, we need to show that axiom (K) is derivable. It
is easy to check that the term
axK
def
= λf : (A→ B). λx : A. let box g ⇐ f in let box y ⇐ x in box (g y)
has type (A → B) → A → B in all our systems other than GL. For GL, we instead
use
ax
DGL
K
def
= λf : (A→ B). λx : A. let box g ⇐ f in let box y ⇐ x in fix z in box (g y)
It is also not hard to see that in DK4 and DS4 the terms
ax4
def
= λx : A. let box y ⇐ x in box (box y)
have type A→ A; that is, axiom 4.
In the case of DGL, we need to show that the term
axGL
def
= λx : (A→ A). let box f ⇐ x in (fix z in box (f z))
has type (A → A) → A. The most interesting part of the derivation can be found in
Figure 3.
· · · ⊢ x : (A→ A)
·
·
·
∆, f : A→ A ; ∆, f⊥ : A→ A, z⊥ : A ⊢ f⊥ z⊥ : A
∆, f : A→ A ; Γ, x : (A→ A) ⊢ fix z in box (f z) : A
∆ ; Γ, x : (A→ A) ⊢ let box f ⇐ x in (fix z in box (f z)) : (A→ A)→ A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ λx : (A→ A). let box f ⇐ x in (fix z in box (f z)) : (A→ A)→ A
Figure 3: Derivation of the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom in DGL
Finally, in DT and DS4, the term
axT
def
= λx : A. let box y ⇐ x in y
has type A→ A, i.e. inhabits axiom T.
With all that, we can show:
Theorem 4.8 (Hilbert to Dual). If Γ is a well-defined context and Γˆ ⊢L A, then there
exists a term M such that · ; Γ ⊢DL M : A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γˆ ⊢L A. In the case of the assumption rule, we
use (var) to type the associated variable in Γˆ. The cases for axioms of (IPL) are easy. For
the modal axioms, we use the terms derived above. For modus ponens, we use application,
i.e. (→ E).
This leaves the case of necessitation. Suppose Γˆ ⊢L A by it; then A ≡ A
′, and ⊢L A
′.
By the IH, there is a term M ′ such that · ; · ⊢DL M
′ : A′. We then use the appropriate
introduction rule for box—e.g. (IK), and so on—to obtain · ; Γ ⊢DL box M
′ : A′.
24 G. A. KAVVOS
4.4.2. Dual to Hilbert. For the opposite direction, the essence lies in showing that the rules
of the dual-context calculus are admissible in the corresponding Hilbert system—that is,
after erasing the proof terms. We have done most of the required work in §2.5.2.
Theorem 4.9 (Dual to Hilbert). If ∆ ; Γ ⊢DL M : A then ∆ˆ, Γˆ ⊢L A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∆ ; Γ ⊢DL M : A.
If the premise holds by (var), then we use the assumption rule of the Hilbert system. If
the last step in the derivation of the premise is the rule (→ I), we use the IH followed by
the Deduction Theorem (Theorem 2.2). If the last step is by (→ E), we use modus ponens.
It is simple to translate the rules that pertain to the product, namely (×I) and (×Ei) to
uses of the IPL axioms pertaining to the product along with modus ponens. It is also not
hard to see that, under the given translation, (E) can also be matched by a use of the IH
along with an invocation of the admissibility of cut for Hilbert systems (Theorem 2.1). Uses
of the modal variable rule (var) can be imitated by a use of the assumption rule, modus
ponens, and an instance of the T axiom.
This leaves the introduction rules for the box. The rule (IK) is matched with Scott’s
rule (Theorem 2.3). The rule (IK4) is matched with the Four rule (Theorem 2.6). The rule
(IGL) is matched with the generalized Lo¨b rule (Theorem 2.8). Finally, the rule (IS4) is
matched with the corollary to the Four rule (Corollary 2.7).
5. Reduction
In this section we study a notion of reduction for the dual-context calculi we introduced in
§4. Our reduction relation,
−→ ⊆ Λ× Λ
is defined in Figure 4, and it is essentially the standard notion of reduction previously
considered by Pfenning and Davies (2001). A similar notion of reduction was studied in the
context of Dual Intuitionistic Linear Logic (DILL) by Ohta and Hasegawa (2006). Unlike the
work in op. cit. we do not study the full reduction including η-contractions and commuting
conversions, and hence our work does not immediately yield a decision procedure for the
theory of equality that we will study in §7.1 and that our categorical semantics will validate.
However, the necessary extensions to the full reduction should be straightforward.
We first show that typing is preserved under reduction, and that reduction is largely
preserved under complementation—that is, if the types are right. Furthermore, we show
that the notion under consideration is confluent. We then briefly introduce the method of
candidates of reducibility, and show that it can be used to demonstrate strong normalization.
Finally, we discuss some commuting conversions, which are necessary for the subformula
property to hold.
5.1. Preservation theorems.
Theorem 5.1 (Subject reduction). If ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A and M −→ N , then ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : A.
Proof. By induction on the generation of M −→ N . Most cases follow straightforwardly
from the IH. The cases for the β rules follow from Theorems 4.4 and 4.6.
The following theorem shall prove useful when showing that strong normalization sat-
isfies the properties necessary for the candidates of reducibility method to apply.
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Rules for all calculi:
(−→ β)
(λx:A. M)N −→M [N/x]
(−→ β×)
πi(〈M1,M2〉) −→Mi
M −→ N
(congπi)πi(M) −→ πi(N)
Mi −→ Ni and M1−i ≡ N1−i
(cong×)
〈M0,M1〉 −→ 〈N0, N1〉
M −→ N
(congλ)
λx:A. M −→ λx:A. N
M −→ N
(congbox)
box M −→ box N
M −→ N
(app1)
MP −→ NP
P −→ Q
(app2)
MP −→MQ
M −→ N
(congfix)
fix z in box M −→ fix z in box N
M −→ N
(letbox1)
let box u⇐M in P −→ let box u⇐ N in P
P −→ Q
(letbox2)
let box u⇐M in P −→ let box u⇐M in Q
Beta rule for non-GL:
(−→ β)
let box u⇐ box M in N −→ N [M/u]
Beta rule for GL:
(−→ βGL)
let box u⇐ fix z in box M in N −→ N [M [fix z in box M/z] /u]
Figure 4: Reduction
Theorem 5.2 (Complement reduction). If ∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢DK4 M
⊥ : A or ∆ ; ∆⊥, z⊥ : A ⊢DGL
M⊥ : A, then M −→ N implies M⊥ −→ N⊥.
5.2. Confluence. We will prove that
Theorem 5.3. The reduction relation −→ is confluent.
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There are many ways to do so. A classic strategy is to exploit the fact we prove in the
next section, viz. that −→ is strongly normalizing, and show local confluence followed by
an appeal to Newman’s Lemma (Newman, 1942; Mitchell, 1996; Terese, 2003).
We will use another method, namely that of parallel reduction, which was discovered
by Tait and Martin-Lo¨f. The basic outline of this method for the untyped λ-calculus is
presented in (Barendregt, 1984, §3.2). Variations of it, as well as its history, are covered
by Takahashi (1995). The idea is simple: we will introduce a second notion of reduction,
=⇒ ⊆ Λ× Λ which we will ‘sandwich’ between reduction proper and its transitive closure:
−→ ⊆ =⇒ ⊆ −→∗
We will then show that =⇒ has the diamond property. By the above inclusions, the transi-
tive closure =⇒∗ of =⇒ is then equal to −→∗, and hence −→ is Church-Rosser.
In fact, we will follow Takahashi (1995) in doing something better: we will define
for each term M its complete development, M⋆. The complete development is intuitively
defined by ‘unrolling’ all the redexes of M at once. We will then show that if M =⇒ N ,
then N =⇒M⋆. M⋆ will then suffice to close the diamond:
M
P Q
M⋆
The parallel reduction =⇒ is defined in Figure 5. It is immediate that
Lemma 5.4. =⇒ is reflexive.
Definition 3 (Complete development). The complete development M⋆ of a term M is
defined by the following clauses:
x⋆
def
= x
(〈M,N〉)⋆
def
= 〈M⋆, N⋆〉
(πi(〈M1,M2〉))
⋆ def=M⋆i
(πi (M))
⋆ def= πi(M
⋆)
(λx:A. M)⋆
def
= λx:A. M⋆
((λx:A. M)N)⋆
def
=M⋆[N⋆/x]
(MN)⋆
def
=M⋆N⋆
(box M)⋆
def
= box M⋆
(let box u⇐ box M in N)⋆
def
= N⋆[M⋆/u]
(let box u⇐M in N)⋆
def
= let box u⇐M⋆ in N⋆
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Rules for all calculi:
(var)
x =⇒ x
M =⇒ N P =⇒ Q
(→ β)
(λx:A. M)P =⇒ N [Q/x]
Mi =⇒ N
(×β)
πi(〈M1,M2〉) =⇒ N
M =⇒ N
(congπi)πi(M) =⇒ πi(N)
M1 =⇒ N1 M2 =⇒ N2
(cong×)
〈M1,M2〉 =⇒ 〈N1, N2〉
M =⇒ N
(congλ)
λx:A. M =⇒ λx:A. N
M =⇒ N
(box)
box M =⇒ box N
M =⇒ N P =⇒ Q
(app)
MP =⇒ NQ
M =⇒ N
(congfix)
fix z in box M =⇒ fix z in box N
M =⇒ N P =⇒ Q
(letbox)
let box u⇐M in P =⇒ let box u⇐ N in Q
Beta rule for non-GL:
M =⇒ N P =⇒ Q
(β)
let box u⇐ box P in M =⇒ N [Q/u]
Beta rule for GL:
M =⇒ N P =⇒ Q
(βGL)
let box u⇐ fix z in box P in M =⇒ N [Q [fix z in box Q/z] /u]
Figure 5: Parallel Reduction
and, in the case of GL,
(fix z in box M)⋆
def
= fix z in box M⋆
(let box u⇐ fix z in box M in N)⋆
def
= N⋆ [M⋆[fix z in box M⋆/z]/u]
First, a little lemma capturing the essence of parallel reduction:
Lemma 5.5. If M =⇒ N and P =⇒ Q, then
M [P/x] =⇒ N [Q/x]
Proof. By induction on the generation of M =⇒ N .
And here is the main result:
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Theorem 5.6. If M =⇒ P , then P =⇒M⋆.
5.3. Strong normalization. In this section, we will prove that
Theorem 5.7. The reduction relation −→ is strongly normalizing.
We shall do so by using the method of candidates of reducibility (candidats de re-
ducibilite´), which is a kind of induction on types, rather closely related to the technique of
logical relations—or, in this particular case, logical predicates. ‘Candidats’ was invented by
Girard (1972) to prove strong normalization for System F, which is covered in (Girard et al.,
1989, §14). The particular variant we use is a mixture of the versions of Girard and Koletsos
(1985). An elementary presentation of the latter may be found in (Gallier, 1995). For a
discussion of other closely related variants see Gallier (1990).
The overall structure of the method is the following: Suppose we have a family of
nonempty sets of typing judgments,
P = {PA}A
indexed by the type A they assign to the term they carry. We will state six properties,
(P0)–(P5), that such a family should satisfy. In case it does indeed satisfy them, we show
that PA contains all judgments ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A with type A.
In our case, we show that the family of typing judgments
SN
def
= {SNA}A
satisfies the properties (P0) through (P5), where SNA consists of all the judgments ∆ ; Γ ⊢
M : A for which M is strongly normalizing with respect to −→ . Then SNA = ΛA, and all
typable terms are strongly normalizing.
The requisite properties follow. If C ⊆ PA, we write ∆ ; Γ ⊢M ∈ C as a shorthand for
(∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A) ∈ C. We also write Γ ⊑ Γ′ to mean that the context Γ is a subsequence of
Γ′ (in other words, Γ′ is obtained after a series of weakening steps on Γ).
Definition 4.
(1) A term is a I-term just if it is an introduction form, i.e. of the form
λx:A. M, 〈M,N〉, box M, fix z in box M (for GL only)
(2) A term is a simple term7 just if it is a variable or an elimination form, i.e. of the form
x, MN, πi(M), let box u⇐M in N
(3) A stubborn term is a simple term that is either a normal form, or a term that does not
reduce to a I-term.
Definition 5 (Properties P0-P3). We define the following properties pertaining to the
family P.
(P0) (a) ∆ ; Γ ⊢M ∈ PA and Γ ⊑ Γ
′ imply ∆ ; Γ′ ⊢M ∈ PA
(b) ∆ ; Γ ⊢M ∈ PA and ∆ ⊑ ∆
′ imply ∆′ ; Γ ⊢M ∈ PA
(c) (for T and S4 only) ∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢M ∈ PA implies ∆,Γ ; Γ
′ ⊢M ∈ PA
(P1) ∆ ; Γ ⊢ x ∈ PA for all variables x.
(P2) M ∈ PA and M −→ N imply N ∈ PA.
7Girard (Girard et al., 1989) calls these neutral terms, which also means something entirely different in
the programming language literature.
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(P3) For simple terms M ,
(a) If
– ∆ ; Γ ⊢M ∈ PA→B ,
– ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N ∈ PA, and
– whenever M −→∗ λx:A.M ′ then ∆ ; Γ ⊢ (λx:A.M ′)N ∈ PB
then this implies ∆ ; Γ ⊢MN ∈ PB .
(b) If
– ∆ ; Γ ⊢M ∈ PA×B , and
– whenever M −→∗ 〈M1,M2〉 then ∆ ; Γ ⊢ π1(〈M1,M2〉) ∈ PA and ∆ ; Γ ⊢
π2(〈M1,M2〉) ∈ PB ,
then this implies that ∆ ; Γ ⊢ π1(M) ∈ PA and ∆ ; Γ ⊢ π2(M) ∈ PB .
Definition 6 (Properties P4-P5).
(P4) (a) If ∆ ; Γ, x:A ⊢M ∈ PB then ∆ ; Γ ⊢ λx:A. M ∈ PA→B.
(b) ∆ ; Γ ⊢M ∈ PA and ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N ∈ PB imply ∆ ; Γ ⊢ 〈M,N〉 ∈ PA×B .
(c)
(i) (for K and T) · ; ∆ ⊢M ∈ PA implies ∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M ∈ PA
(ii) (for K4) ∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢M⊥ ∈ PA implies ∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M ∈ PA
(iii) (for GL) ∆ ; ∆⊥, z⊥ : A ⊢M⊥ ∈ PA implies ∆ ; Γ ⊢ fix z in box M ∈ PA
(iv) (for S4) ∆ ; · ⊢M ∈ PA implies ∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M ∈ PA
(P5) (a) If ∆′ ⊒ ∆ and Γ′ ⊒ Γ satisfy ∆′ ; Γ′ ⊢ N ∈ PA and ∆
′ ; Γ′ ⊢ M [N/x] ∈ PB , then
∆′ ; Γ′ ⊢ (λx:A. M)N ∈ PB .
(b) ∆ ; Γ ⊢ M ∈ PA and ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N ∈ PB imply ∆ ; Γ ⊢ π1(〈M,N〉) ∈ PA and
∆ ; Γ ⊢ π2(〈M,N〉) ∈ PB .
(c) (i) (for non-GL) If we have ∆ ; Γ ⊢ M ∈ PA and ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N ∈ PC , and
whenever M −→∗ box Q then ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N [Q/u] ∈ PC , then we have that
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N ∈ PC .
(ii) (for GL only) If we have ∆ ; Γ ⊢ M ∈ PA and ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N ∈ PC , and
whenever M −→∗ fix z in box Q then ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N [Q[fix z in box Q/z]/u] ∈ PC ,
then we have that ∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N ∈ PC .
Showing that these properties guarantee that PA = ΛA consists of a laborious inductive
argument that employs multiple lemmata. It is then reasonably straightforward to verify
that the above properties hold of the family SN : the proof proceeds by induction on the
depth d(M) of a strongly normalizing term M , which is the longest path to a leaf in its
reduction tree.
5.4. Subformula property. The notion of reduction we have studied in this section is
computationally interesting, but is logically weak, in the sense that it does not satisfy the
subformula property.
A calculus satisfies the subformula property when any normal proof (i.e. one that
has no reducts) of formula A from assumptions Γ only involves formulæthat are either (a)
subexpressions/subformulæof the conclusion of A, or (b) subexpressions/subformulæof some
premise in Γ. This is almost sufficient to say that the proof has a very specific structure: it
proceeds by eliminating logical symbols of assumptions in Γ, and then uses the results to
‘build up‘ a proof of A using only introduction rules. In short, the proof has no detours, and
proceeds as quickly as possible from assumptions to conclusion. See Prawitz (1965) and
Girard et al. (1989) for a fuller discussion of these points.
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Let us return to our systems: they do not satisfy the subformula property because of
the elimination rule:
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : C
(E)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N : C
Notice that the conclusion C is given to us by the minor premise ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : C, and
it is structurally unrelated to A, the major premise that is being eliminated: in Girard’s
terminology, it is parasitic. This is so because the elimination rule is secretly a kind of cut
rule, or a rule in the style of Schroeder-Heister (1984).
It is not so easy at first to see where the actual trouble with this kind of rule is; the
point is that the let box u⇐ (−) in (−) construct may ‘hide redexes’ that should be reduced.
Once we introduce the extra reductions that are needed and prove the subformula property
this will become quite clear. But—in the meantime—let us consider three examples.
Suppose that ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ 〈N1, N2〉 : A1 × A2, and that ∆ ; Γ ⊢ M : A. We may use
(E) to obtain
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in 〈N1, N2〉 : A1 ×A2
This is indeed—and should be!—a normal form. But what if we just want to prove A1? We
may apply the elimination rule:
∆ ; Γ ⊢ π1 (let box u⇐M in 〈N1, N2〉) : A1
Now, this is a proof of A1, but it surreptitiously contains a proof N2 of A2 as well, which
is entirely unrelated to A1 (neither need be a subexpression of the other). But, according
to our notion of reduction, it is normal! The problem is that the let box u ⇐ (−) in (−)
obstructs the meeting of the destructor π1(−) with the constructor 〈N1, N2〉. The solution
is to allow a commuting conversion that allows the two to meet, by ‘pulling the let construct
outside:’
π1 (let box u⇐M in 〈N1, N2〉) −→ let box u⇐M in π1(〈N1, N2〉)
A similar situation occurs when ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ λx:A.P : A→ B: we may form
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in λx:A. P : A→ B
which is a perfectly reasonable normal form, but if ∆ ; Γ ⊢ Q : A then
∆ ; Γ ⊢ (let box u⇐M in λx:A. P )Q : B
is not: we should be able to reduce
(let box u⇐M in λx:A. P )Q −→ let box u⇐M in (λx:A. P )Q
Finally, there is third, less visible case of this phenomenon. If we understand (E) to be
a ‘bad’ elimination, we have considered the cases of ‘good’ elimination (πi(−), application)
following ‘bad’ elimination. The final case is that of ‘bad’ elimination following another ‘bad’
elimination. To give an example, let us consider an elimination after a box (−) introduction:
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in box N : A
If we then have a term ∆, v:A ; Γ ⊢ P : C, we can plug this in by eliminating the box:
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box v ⇐ (let box u⇐M in box N) in P : C
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Now things are clear: the second let-construct is obstructing the meeting of the first let-
construct with the introduction form box N . We need to convert:
let box v ⇐ (let box u⇐M in box N) in P
−→ let box u⇐M in let box v ⇐ box N in P
but we should take care to rename u so that it does not occur in P—as it would be wrongly
bound otherwise.
These examples actually cover all cases. We define −→ c ⊆ Λ×Λ to be the compatible
closure of −→ that includes the following clauses:
πi (let box u⇐M in N) −→ c let box u⇐M in πi(N)
(let box u⇐M in P )Q −→ c let box u⇐M in PQ
let box v ⇐ (let box u⇐M in N) in P −→ c let box u⇐M in let box v ⇐ N in P
We can now prove the requisite property for this reduction relation: one only needs to
take enough care to strengthen the induction hypothesis sufficiently.
Theorem 5.8 (Subformula Property). Let ∆ ; Γ ⊢ M : A, and suppose M is a (−→ c)-
normal form. Then,
(1) Every type occuring in the derivation of ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A is either a subexpression of the
type A, or a subexpression of a type in ∆ or Γ.
(2) If M is an elimination construct that is not of the form let box u ⇐ P in Q—i.e. if it
is a projection πi(N) or an application PQ—then it entirely consists of a sequence of
eliminations: that is, there is a sequence of types,
A0, . . . , An
such that
• A0 occurs in either ∆ or Γ,
• An is A, and
• Ai is the major premise of an elimination whose conclusion is Ai+1 for i = 0, . . . , n.
In particular, An is a subexpression of A0.
This is called a principal branch.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A.
We have thus established the notion of reduction −→ c, which eliminates any struc-
turally irrelevant occurences from a proof of the formula. Of course, one should extend
the preceding analysis of −→ to this notion, but we think that this may be harder than
it sounds. A full analysis would follow the lines of the one in Ohta and Hasegawa (2006),
whilst keeping in mind that we are not trying to decide an equality like in op. cit., but that
we are merely eliminating parasitic formulae.
6. Modal category theory
In order to formulate categorical semantics for our calculi, we shall need—first and foremost—
a cartesian closed category (CCC), for the underlying λ-calculus. For background on carte-
sian closed categories, we refer to (Crole, 1993) and (Abramsky and Tzevelekos, 2011).
We shall model the modality by a strong monoidal endofunctor. In our case, the
monoidal product will be the cartesian product of the cartesian closed category. We will
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show that this coincides with the notion of product-preserving endofunctor, and hence gives
rise to the isomorphism
(A×B) ∼= A×B
which is another way of stating the modal axiom K.
In this section we introduce a modest amount of monoidal category theory that we
will use in our modelling attempts. Further material on monoidal functors can be found in
MacLane (Mac Lane, 1978, §XI.2). We draw a lot on a superbly lucid treatment by Mellie`s
(Mellie`s, 2009, §5), which is specifically geared towards categorical logic.
6.1. Cartesian closed categories.
Definition 7. A category C is cartesian closed just if it is cartesian (i.e. has a terminal
object 1 and a binary products) and has exponentials, i.e. for each pair of objects A,B ∈ C
there is an object BA ∈ C and an arrow
evA,B : B
A ×A→ B
such that for every f : C ×A→ B there is a unique λ(f) : C → BA such that the following
diagram commutes:
BA ×A B
C ×A
evA,B
f
λ(f)× idA
There are many equivalent definitions of cartesian closure. The above is that of the existence
of a couniversal arrow from −×A to B for each pair of objects A,B ∈ C. It is the same as
requiring the existence of a right adjoint to the functor −×A—see (Crole, 1993).
6.2. Lax and strong monoidal functors. Let C and D be cartesian categories. We
regard them as monoidal categories (C,×,1) and (D,×,1) respectively.
Definition 8. A functor F : C −→ D between two cartesian categories is lax monoidal just
if it is equipped with a natural transformation
m : F (−)× F (−)⇒ F (− ×−)
as well as an arrow m0 : 1→ F (1) such that the following diagrams commute:
(FA× FB)× FC FA× (FB × FC)
F (A×B)× FC FA× F (B × C)
F ((A×B)× C) F (A× (B × C))
α
mA,B × idFC idFA ×mB,C
mA×B,C mA,B×C
Fα
(6.1)
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FA× 1 FA
FA× F1 F (A× 1)
ρA
idFA ×m0
mA,1
FρA
1× FB FB
F1× FB F (1×B)
λB
m0 × idFB
m1,B
FλB (6.2)
Definition 9. A strong monoidal functor between two cartesian categories is a lax monoidal
functor where the components mA,B : FA× FB → F (A× B) and the arrow m0 : 1→ F1
are isomorphisms.
These natural transformations can be extended to more objects. We write
n∏
i=1
An
for the product A1 × · · · ×An, where × associates to the left.
We define, by induction:
m(0)
def
= 1
m0−−→ F1
m(1)
def
= FA1
idFA1−−−−→ FA1
m(n+1)
def
=
n+1∏
i=1
FAi
m(n)×id
−−−−−→ F
(
n∏
i=1
Ai
)
× FAn+1
m
−→ F
(
n+1∏
i=1
Ai
)
Then the m(n)’s are a natural transformation, so that
m(n) ◦
n∏
i=1
Ffi = F
(
n∏
i=1
fi
)
◦m(n)
We also note that if F : C −→ C is a monoidal endofunctor, then so is F 2
def
= F ◦ F , with
components
nA,B
def
= F 2A× F 2B
mA,B
−−−→ F (FA× FB)
FmA,B
−−−−→ F 2(A×B)
and n0
def
= Fm0 ◦m0—see e.g. (Mellie`s, 2009, §5.9).
6.2.1. Product-Preserving Functors. Lax and strong monoidal functors are widely used as
notions of morphism between monoidal categories. However, in our setting, the monoidal
product will always be the cartesian product. In the rest of this section we note some facts
which are particular to the cartesian case.
To start, here is another notion of a functor between cartesian categories that ‘plays
well with products,’ namely that of product-preserving functors. The definition initially
appears to be much stronger than simple monoidality.
Definition 10. A product-preserving functor F : C −→ D between two cartesian categories
is a functor for which the arrows
pA,B
def
= 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉 : F (A×B)
∼=
−→ FA× FB
p0
def
= !F1 : F1
∼=
−→ 1
are isomorphisms.
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Product-preserving functors are—indeed—strong monoidal. To show that, all we need to
consider is the inverse of the arrows required by the definition, namely
mA,B
def
= p−1A,B : FA× FB
∼=
−→ F (A×B)
m0
def
= p−10 : 1
∼=
−→ F1
Before we show that, we note that product-preserving functions satisfy two remarkably
useful equations. The first is
Proposition 6.1. If F is product-preserving, then
mA,B ◦ 〈Ff, Fg〉 = F 〈f, g〉
for f : C → A, and g : D → B.
Proof. We may compute
pA,B ◦ F 〈f, g〉 = 〈Fπ1 ◦ F 〈f, g〉, Fπ2 ◦ F 〈f, g〉〉 = 〈Ff, Fg〉
and, since p−1A,B = mA,B, the result follows.
The second equation concerns the fact that the mA,B’s may be used to relate the
projections with their image under the functor.
Proposition 6.2. Let F : C −→ D be product-preserving, and let
A
π
A,B
1←−−− A×B
π
A,B
2−−−→ B
and
FA
π
FA,FB
1←−−−−− FA× FB
π
FA,FB
2−−−−−→ FB
be product diagrams in C and D respectively. Then
FπA,Bi ◦mA,B = π
FA,FB
i
Proof. πi ◦m
−1
A,B = πi ◦ 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉 = Fπi
We will often write equations of this sort as Fπ1 ◦m = π1 without further ado. Armed with
these facts, it is now easy to see that
Theorem 6.3. Any product-preserving functor is strong monoidal, with mA,B and m0 de-
fined as above.
Rather strikingly, the converse holds as well: these two notions of functors between cartesian
categories coincide.
Theorem 6.4. Any strong monoidal functor between two cartesian categories is product-
preserving.
Proof. Note that m−10 : F1 −→ 1 is necessarily equal to the unique arrow !F1 : F1 −→ 1 to
the terminal object 1. Hence, it suffices to show that, for any A,B ∈ C, m−1A,B = 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉.
We will first show a particular case, viz. that
m−1A,1 = 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉
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from which the general case will follow. Remembering that ρA
def
= π1 : A× 1→ A, we have
that ρ−1A = 〈idFA, !FA〉 : FA → FA × 1. Hence, by reversing ρA and mA,1 in the first
diagram of (6.2), we obtain
m−1A,1 = (idA ×m0) ◦ 〈idFA, !FA〉 ◦ Fπ1 = 〈Fπ1,m0 ◦ !F (A×1)〉 : F (A× 1)→ FA× F1
But, as m0 : 1
∼=
−→ F1, F1 is also a terminal object, and any arrow into it is of the form
m0 ◦ !A : A→ F1. This applies to Fπ2 : F (A× 1)→ F1, so
m−1A,1 = 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉
Now for the general case. As mA,B is a natural isomorphism, its inverse is a natural
transformation with components m−1A,B. The naturality square for (idA, !B) is
F (A×B) FA× FB
F (A× 1) FA× F1
m−1A,B
F (idA × !B) idFA × F (!B)
m−1A,1
Calculating down and across gives
m−1A,1 ◦ F (idA × !B) = 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉 ◦ F (idA × !B) = 〈Fπ1, F (!B ◦ π2)〉
whereas across and down gives
(idFA × F (!B)) ◦m
−1
A,B = 〈π1 ◦m
−1
A,B, F (!B) ◦ π2 ◦m
−1
A,B〉
The first two components of these should be equal, therefore π1 ◦m
−1
A,B = Fπ1. Similarly,
π2 ◦m
−1
A,B = Fπ2, and hence m
−1
A,B = 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉.
6.2.2. Monoidal natural transformations. The standard notion of natural transformation
between lax monoidal functors is the following:
Definition 11. Let F,G : C −→ D be two lax monoidal functors between two cartesian
categories C,D. A monoidal natural transformation between F and G is a natural transfor-
mation α : F ⇒ G such that the following diagrams commute:
FA× FB GA×GB
F (A×B) G(A×B)
αA × αB
mA,B nA,B
αA×B
1
F1 G1
n0m0
α1
Surprisingly, it is not hard to show that
Theorem 6.5. If F,G : C −→ D are product-preserving functors between two cartesian cat-
egories, then any natural transformation α : F ⇒ G is a monoidal natural transformation.
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Proof. We trivially have !G1◦α1 = !F1. But !G1 and !F1 are isomorphisms, so—by inverting
them—we obtain α1 ◦m0 = n0. Furthermore, we have the following naturality diagram:
F (A×B) FA
G(A×B) GA
Fπ1
αA×B αA
Gπ1
and a similar one for B. Hence, n−1A,B ◦ αA×B
def
= 〈Gπ1, Gπ2〉 ◦ αA×B is equal to
〈Gπ1 ◦ αA×B, Gπ2 ◦ αA×B〉 = 〈αA ◦ Fπ1, αB ◦ Fπ2〉 = (αA × αB) ◦ 〈Fπ1, Fπ2〉
which is just (αA × αB) ◦m
−1
A,B. It then suffices to reverse mA,B and nA,B.
6.3. Categorical models of modal logic. In this section we introduce the main defini-
tions of the structures needed to produce categories that can interpret our modal calculi.
We begin with the basic two examples of Kripke categories (K), and Bierman–de Paiva cat-
egories (S4). These are the most well-behaved, and most commonly encountered cases. We
then discuss the slightly more obscure cases of Kripke-4 categories (K4), Kripke-T categories
(T), and finally Go¨del-Lo¨b categories (GL).
6.3.1. Kripke categories. The combination of a CCC with a product-preserving endofunctor
is the quintessential structure in our development, so we give it a name.
Definition 12. A Kripke category (C,×,1, F ) is a cartesian closed category C along with
a product-preserving endofunctor F : C −→ C.
Kripke categories are the minimal setting in which one can model Scott’s rule (see
§2.5.2), by defining an operation
(−)• : C
(
n∏
i=1
Ai, B
)
→ C
(
n∏
i=1
FAi, FB
)
as follows:
f :
n∏
i=1
Ai → B
f•
def
=
n∏
i=1
FAi
m(n)
−−−→ F
(
n∏
i=1
Ai
)
Ff
−−→ FB
The operation (−)• satisfies the following ‘distribution’ laws.
Proposition 6.6.
(1) Let f :
∏n
i=1Bi → C and gi :
∏k
j=1Aj → Bi for i = 1, . . . , n. Then
(f ◦ 〈−→gi 〉)
•
= f• ◦
〈−→
g•i
〉
(2) For f :
∏n
i=1Ai → B and 〈 ~πj〉 :
∏n
i=1 FAi →
∏
j∈J FAj for J a list with elements from
{1, . . . , n},
(f ◦ 〈 ~πj〉)
• = f• ◦ 〈 ~πj〉
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6.3.2. Bierman-de Paiva categories. In order to model S4, we need a Kripke category whose
product-preserving functor is additionally a comonad.
Definition 13. A comonad (F, ǫ, δ) consists of an endofunctor F : C −→ C, and two natural
transformations
ǫ : F ⇒ Id, δ : F ⇒ F 2
such that the following diagrams commute:
FA F 2A
F 2A F 3A
δA
δA δFA
FδA
FA F 2A
F 2A FA
δA
δA
idFA ǫFA
FǫA
In particular, we will require that the comonad used is monoidal, in that it satsfies some
additional coherence conditions.
Definition 14. A monoidal comonad on a cartesian category C is a comonad (F, ǫ, δ)
such that F : C −→ C is a lax monoidal functor, and ǫ : F ⇒ Id and δ : F ⇒ F 2
are monoidal natural transformations. Concretely, this amounts to commutation of the
following diagrams:
FA× FB A×B
F (A×B) A×B
ǫA × ǫB
mA,B
ǫA×B
1
F1 1
m0
ǫ1
(6.3)
FA× FB F 2A× F 2B
F (FA× FB)
F (A×B) F 2(A×B)
δA × δB
mA,B
mFA,FB
FmA,B
δA×B
1
F1
F1 F 21
m0
m0
Fm0
δ1
(6.4)
However, since the functors that we use are product-preserving, or strong monoidal, it
follows automatically by Theorem 6.5 that
Corollary 6.7. If (F, ǫ, δ) is a comonad whose functor F is product-preserving, then it is
a monoidal comonad.
We shall not hence explicitly worry about monoidality, neither in this section nor in the
ones that follow it. We will, however, use the equations with which it furnishes our natural
transformations without further explanation.
Definition 15. A Bierman-de Paiva category (BdP category) (C,×,1, F, ǫ, δ) is a Kripke
category (C,×,1, F ) whose functor F : C −→ C is part of a comonad (F, ǫ, δ).
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Bierman-de Paiva categories are the minimal setting in which both the Four and T rules
can be modelled. The T rule is modelled directly by the (monoidal) natural transformation
ǫ. On the other hand, the Four rule is modelled by (a generalisation of) something already
well-known in category theory, namely the co-Kleisli lifting :
(−)∗ : C
(
n∏
i=1
FAi, B
)
→ C
(
n∏
i=1
FAi, FB
)
which is defined as follows:
f :
n∏
i=1
FAi → B
f∗
def
=
n∏
i=1
FAi
∏n
i=1 δAi−−−−−−→
n∏
i=1
F 2Ai
m(n)
−−−→ F
(
n∏
i=1
FAi
)
Ff
−−→ FB
This operation interacts in a useful manner with the transformations δ and ǫ.
Proposition 6.8.
(1) Let f :
∏n
i=1 FAi → B. Then δB ◦ f
∗ = (f∗)∗.
(2) Let f :
∏n
i=1 FAi → B. Then ǫB ◦ f
∗ = f .
The co-Kleisli extension also satisfies a handful of very useful equations:
Proposition 6.9.
(1) id∗FA = δFA
(2) ǫ∗A = idFA
(3) Let f :
∏n
i=1Bi → C and gi :
∏k
j=1 FAj → Bi for i = 1, . . . , n. Then
(f ◦ 〈−→gi 〉)
∗
= f• ◦
〈−→
g∗i
〉
(4) For ki :
∏m
j=1 FAj → Bj and l :
∏n
i=1 FBi → C,(
l ◦
〈−→
k∗i
〉)∗
= l∗ ◦
〈−→
k∗i
〉
(5) For f :
∏n
i=1 FAi → B and 〈 ~πj〉 :
∏n
i=1 FAi →
∏
j∈J FAj for J a list with elements
from {1, . . . , n},
(f ◦ 〈 ~πj〉)
∗ = f∗ ◦ 〈 ~πj〉
Proof. (1) and (2) are standard comonad equations. (3) is a straightforward calculation,
similar to Proposition 6.6(1). (4) follows from (3), Proposition 6.8(1), and f∗
def
= f• ◦
∏
δ.
(5) is a corollary of (3), once we notice that π∗i = δAi ◦ πi, and use of f
∗ def= f• ◦
∏
δ.
Idempotence. It is interesting to separately consider those BdP categories for which the
comonad (F, ǫ, δ) is idempotent, i.e. δ : F ⇒ F 2 is an isomorphism (which is to say each of
its components are). There are many equivalent ways to define idempotence—see (Borceux,
1994, §4.3.2). One of them is that δFA ◦ ǫFA = idF 2A for each object A. Here, we will use
the equation FǫA = ǫFA for each object A. Restated in our notation:
ǫ•A = ǫFA : F
2A→ FA
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Proposition 6.10. If (F, ǫ, δ) is idempotent, then
(ǫB ◦ f)
∗ = f
for f :
∏n
i=1 FAi → FB.
Proof. By Proposition 6.9(3), (ǫ ◦ f)∗ = ǫ• ◦ f∗ = ǫ ◦ f∗ = f
This situation creates an additional sort of naturality for (−)∗, essentially by making Propo-
sition 6.9(4) universally applicable.
Proposition 6.11. For any f :
∏m
j=1 FBj → FC, and any kj :
∏n
i=1 FAi → FBj , we have(
f ◦
〈−→
ki
〉)∗
= f∗ ◦
〈−→
ki
〉
Proof. Using Propositions 6.10 and 6.9(4),(
f ◦
〈−→
kj
〉)∗
=
(
f ◦
〈−−−−−−−→(
ǫBj ◦ kj
)∗〉)∗
= f∗ ◦
〈−−−−−−−→(
ǫBj ◦ kj
)∗〉
= f∗ ◦
〈−→
kj
〉
Thus, we have the following situation
Theorem 6.12 (Idempotence). (F, ǫ, δ) is idempotent if and only if the map
(−)∗ : C
(
n∏
i=1
FAi, B
)
→ C
(
n∏
i=1
FAi, FB
)
is an isomorphism, natural with respect to precomposition of morphisms k :
∏n
j=1 FDj →∏n
i=1 FAi.
Proof. For the backwards direction, the inverse of (−)∗ is ǫB ◦−: it is a left and right inverse
to (−)∗ by Propositions 6.8(2) and 6.10. Naturality follows by Proposition 6.11 once we
write k =
〈−−−→
πi ◦ k
〉
.
For the forwards direction, we calculate
δFA ◦ ǫFA = id
∗
FA ◦ ǫFA = (idFA ◦ ǫFA)
∗ = ǫ∗FA = idF 2A
by Prop. 6.9(1), naturality for ǫFA : F
2A→ FA, and Prop. 6.9(2).
6.3.3. Kripke-4 categories. Kripke-4 categories model K4; they are essentially ‘half a comonad,’
namely the half that consists of the comultiplication δ. We still require that one of the
comonadic equations, viz. the one that only refers to δ, holds.
Definition 16. A Kripke-4 category (C,×,1, F, δ) is a Kripke category (C,×,1, F ) along
with a natural transformation δ : F ⇒ F 2 such that the following diagram commutes:
FA F 2A
F 2A F 3A
δA
δA δFA
FδA
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We know once more, by Theorem 6.5, that δ : F ⇒ F 2 is a monoidal natural transformation,
which means that the diagrams (6.4) commute.
We can model the general version of Four rule in Kripke-4 categories, but in a way
that is slightly more involved than the simple co-Kleisli lifting of Bierman–de Paiva cate-
gories. They are the minimal setting in which this can happen; see §2.5.2. To see this, let
(C,×,1, F, δ) be a Kripke-4 category, and write
n∏
i=1
Ai ×l
m∏
j=1
Bj
to mean the left-associating product A1 × · · · ×An ×B1 × · · · ×Bm. Also, write
〈
−→
fi ,
−→gi ,
−→
hj〉
to mean the left-associating mediating morphism 〈f1, . . . , fn, g1, . . . , gm, h1, . . . , gp〉. With
this notation we can now define a map of hom-sets
(−)# : C
(
n∏
i=1
FAi ×l
n∏
i=1
Ai, B
)
→ C
(
n∏
i=1
FAi, FB
)
as follows:
f :
n∏
i=1
FAi ×l
n∏
i=1
Ai → B
f#
def
=
n∏
i=1
FAi
〈
−−−→
δAiπi,
−→πi〉
−−−−−−→
n∏
i=1
F 2Ai ×l
∏
i=1
Ai
m(2n)
−−−→ F
(
n∏
i=1
FAi ×l
n∏
i=1
Ai
)
Ff
−−→ B
Even though it might seem slightly unnatural at first sight, we can show that the (−)#
operation satisfies some equations similar to the ones encountered before.
Proposition 6.13.
(1) Let f :
∏n
i=1Bi → C and gi :
∏k
j=1 FAj ×l
∏k
j=1Aj → Bi for i = 1, . . . , n. Then
(f ◦ 〈−→gi 〉)
#
= f• ◦
〈−→
g#i
〉
(2) Let J be a list with elements from {1, . . . , n}. Then we have
(f ◦ 〈−−→πFj,
−→πj〉)
#
= f# ◦ 〈−→πj〉
where 〈−−→πFj,
−→πj〉 :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×l
∏n
i=1Ai →
∏
j∈J FAj ×l
∏
j∈J Aj is the projection that
‘follows J in both contexts’
∏n
i=1 FAi and
∏n
i=1Ai.
(3) For k :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×l
∏n
i=1Ai → B and l : FB → C, then
(l ◦ k#)∗ = l∗ ◦ k#
Proof. Straightforward calculations, similar to Propositions 6.6 and 6.9.
Proposition 6.14. Let f :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×l
∏n
i=1Ai → B. Then
δB ◦ f
# =
(
f#
)∗
When the morphism of type
∏n
i=1 FAi ×l
∏n
i=1Ai → B does not depend on the Ai,
then the operation (−)# is reduced to (−)∗.
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Proposition 6.15. Let f :
∏n
i=1 FAi → B. Then, writing π :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×l
∏n
i=1Ai →∏n
i=1 FAi for the projection,
(f ◦ π)# = f∗
Proof. Straightforward calculation using Propositions 6.1 and 6.2.
And, finally, we prove another crucial distribution property of (−)#. Namely, if we substi-
tute ‘the same thing’ for both contexts, the hash distributes as such:
Proposition 6.16. Let f :
∏n
i=1 FBi ×
∏n
i=1Bi → B, and gi :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×
∏n
i=1Ai → Bi.
Then, writing π :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×
∏n
i=1Ai →
∏n
i=1 FAi for the projection,(
f ◦ 〈
−−−−→
g#i ◦ π,
−→gi 〉
)#
= f# ◦
〈−→
g#i
〉
Proof. (
f ◦
〈−−−−→
g#i ◦ π,
−→gi
〉)#
= {Proposition 6.13(1) }
f• ◦
〈−−−−−−−→(
g#i ◦ π
)#
,
−→
g#i
〉
= {Proposition 6.15 }
f• ◦
〈−−−−→(
g#i
)∗
,
−→
g#i
〉
= {Proposition 6.14 }
f• ◦
〈−−−→
δ ◦ g#i ,
−→
g#i
〉
= {definitions }
f# ◦ 〈
−→
g#i 〉
6.3.4. Kripke-T categories. The following structure will be the categorical analogue to the
logic T.
Definition 17. A Kripke-T category (C,×,1, F, ǫ) is a Kripke category (C,×,1, F ) along
with a natural transformation
ǫ : F ⇒ Id
Using Theorem 6.5 again we see ǫ : F ⇒ Id is a monoidal natural transformation, the
diagrams (6.3) commute. Modelling the T rule from §2.5.2 amounts to precomposition with
the product of a bunch of components of ǫ : F ⇒ Id. This operation interacts nicely with
Scott’s rule:
Proposition 6.17. Let f :
∏n
i=1Ai → B. Then
ǫB ◦ f
• = f ◦
n∏
i=1
ǫAi
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6.3.5. Go¨del-Lo¨b categories. We are looking for a setting where Lo¨b’s rule can be modelled.
This requires a notion of modal fixed point.
Definition 18 (Modal Fixed Point). Let (C,×,1, F, δ) be a Kripke-4 category. A modal
fixed point of f :
∏n
i=1 FBi ×
∏n
i=1Bi × FA→ A is an arrow
f † :
n∏
i=1
FBi → FA
such that the following diagram commutes:
∏n
i=1 FBi F (
∏n
i=1 FBi ×
∏n
i=1Bi)× F
2A
FA
〈id#,
(
f †
)∗
〉
f †
f•
Definition 19 (Modal Fixed Points). Given Kripke-4 category (C,×,1, F, δ), an object
A ∈ C has modal fixed points just if for any Bi ∈ C there is a hom-set map
(−)†−→
B
: C
(
n∏
i=1
FBi ×
n∏
i=1
Bi × FA,A
)
→ C
(
n∏
i=1
FBi, FA
)
such that f †−→
B
is a modal fixed point of each f :
∏n
i=1 FBi ×
∏n
i=1Bi × FA→ A.
We will often write f †, dropping the subscript entirely. This is an external specification
of modal fixed points, in the sense that they are given as a map on the hom-sets of the
Kripke-4 category. We might instead consider an internal specification, i.e. through an
appropriate notion of a modal fixed point combinator. This will—unsurprisingly—be an
arrow F (AFA) → FA, which is the type of the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom (A → A) → A of
provability logic. This kind of combinator comes in two varieties.
Definition 20. Let (C,×,1, F, δ) be a Kripke-4 category.
(1) A strong modal fixed point combinator at A ∈ C is an arrow
YA : F (A
FA)→ FA
such that the following diagram commutes:
F (AFA) F (AFA)× F 2A
FA
〈id, Y ∗A〉
YA
ev•
(2) A weak modal fixed point combinator at A ∈ C is an arrow
YA : F (A
FA)→ FA
such that for each B and f :
∏n
i=1 FBi ×
∏n
i=1Bi × FA→ A,
n∏
i=1
FBi
(λ(f))#
−−−−−→ F (AFA)
YA−−→ FA
is a modal fixed point of f .
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We can prove that having a modal fixed point combinator at A, as above, is equivalent to
having modal fixed points at A. But to do so we will need a lemma concerning cartesian
closure in this setting.
Lemma 6.18. If f :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×
∏n
i=1Ai × FB → B and a :
∏n
i=1 FAi → F
2A, then
ev
• ◦ 〈(λf)# , a〉 = f• ◦ 〈id#, a〉
Theorem 6.19. Let there be a Kripke-4 category (C,×,1, F, δ). Then the following are
equivalent:
(1) There is a strong modal fixed point combinator at A.
(2) There is a weak modal fixed point combinator at A.
(3) The object A ∈ C has modal fixed points.
Proof. To prove (1)⇒ (2), if we are given such a Y we calculate
Y ◦ λf#
= {definition of strong mfpc, naturality of product morphism }
ev• ◦ 〈λf#, Y ∗ ◦ λf#〉
= {Proposition 6.13(3) }
ev• ◦ 〈λf#, (Y ◦ λf#)∗〉
= {Proposition 6.18 }
f• ◦ 〈id#, (Y ◦ λf#)∗〉
so Y indeed yields modal fixed points. (2)⇒ (3) is trivial, so it remains to show (3)⇒ (1).
Let
g
def
= F (AFA)×AFA × FA
〈π2,π3〉
−−−−→ AFA × FA
ev
−→ A
We show that g† : F (AFA) → FA is a strong modal fixed point combinator at A. Indeed,
it is not very hard to calculate that
g† = ev• ◦ 〈id,
(
g†
)∗
〉
We formulate the following naturality property of modal fixed points, which is partly remi-
niscent of the ones in (Simpson and Plotkin, 2000), but also resembles Proposition 6.16.
Proposition 6.20. If we define (−)†B by a weak modal fixed point combinator, then the
resulting modal fixed points are natural, in the sense that for any f :
∏n
i=1 FAi×
∏n
i=1Ai×
A→ A and any gi :
∏m
j=1 FBj ×
∏m
j=1Bj → Bi, then, writing π :
∏m
j=1 FBi ×
∏m
j=1Aj →∏m
j=1 FBi for the projection,(
f ◦
(〈−−−−→
g#i ◦ π,
−→
g#i
〉
× idA
))†
= f † ◦
〈−→
g#i
〉
Proof. The LHS is equal to
Y ◦
(
λ
(
f ◦
(〈−−−−→
g#i ◦ π,
−→
g#i
〉
× idA
)))#
44 G. A. KAVVOS
which, using naturality of λ(−) and Proposition 6.16, is equal to Y ◦ (λ(f))# ◦
〈−→
g#i
〉
, and
hence to the RHS.
We can finally define:
Definition 21. AGo¨del-Lo¨b category
(
C,×,1, F, δ, (−)†
)
is a Kripke-4 category (C,×,1, F, δ)
that has modal fixed points at all objects A, given by maps
(−)†−→
B,A
: C
(
n∏
i=1
FBi ×
n∏
i=1
Bi × FA,A
)
→ C
(
n∏
i=1
FBi, FA
)
which, moreover, are natural, in the sense that for any f :
∏n
i=1 FAi ×
∏n
i=1Ai × A → A
and gi :
∏m
j=1 FBj ×
∏m
j=1Bj → Bi,(
f ◦
(〈−−−−→
g#i ◦ π,
−→
g#i
〉
× idA
))†
−→
B,A
= f †−→
A,A
◦
〈−→
g#i
〉
The preceding theorem (Theorem 6.19) assures us that, as long as we are given a Kripke-4
category, it does not matter whether we are given a strong modal fixed point combinator,
a weak modal fixed point combinator, or simply modal fixed points, as we can turn any of
these three flavours into a standard Go¨del-Lo¨b category.
Finally, to close this section we show that whenever the modal fixed point has no
‘diagonal’ occurences, it deteriorates to the (−)# operation.
Proposition 6.21. If f :
∏n
i=1 FAi×
∏n
i=1Ai×A→ B and π :
∏n
i=1 FAi×
∏n
i=1Ai×A→∏n
i=1 FAi ×
∏n
i=1Ai is the obvious projection, then
(f ◦ π)† = f#
Proof. Writing g
def
= (f ◦ π)†, we have
g = (f ◦ π)• ◦
〈
id#, g∗
〉
= f• ◦ π ◦
〈
id#, g∗
〉
= f• ◦ id# = (f ◦ id)# = f#
by the definition of modal fixed point, and Prop. 6.6(2), 6.13(1).
7. Categorical semantics
In this section we use the modal category theory developed in §6 to formulate a categorical
semantics for our dual-context calculi. This completes the circle in terms of the Curry-
Howard-Lambek correspondence, showing the following associations:
CK ←→ DK ←→ Kripke categories
CK4 ←→ DK4 ←→ Kripke-4 categories
CGL ←→ DGL ←→ Go¨del-Lo¨b categories
CT ←→ DT ←→ Kripke-T categories
CS4 ←→ DS4 ←→ Bierman-de Paiva categories
where the first bi-implication refers to provability, and the second to soundness and com-
pleteness of the dual-context calculus with respect to the type of category on the right. Of
the latter half, only soundness of DS4 in Bierman-de Paiva categories has been previously
obtained by Hofmann (1999).
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We begin by endowing our calculi with an equational theory, and then proceed to show
soundness and completeness with respect to it.
7.1. Equational theory. To state the full set of equations, we will need the notion of term
contexts, i.e. terms with a single hole.
Definition 22 (Term Contexts).
(1) Term contexts C[−] are defined by
C[−] ::= [−] | λx:A. C[−] | C[−]M |M C[−]
| 〈C[−],M〉 | 〈M,C[−]〉 | πi(C[−])
| box C[−] | let box u⇐ C[−] in M
| let box u⇐M in C[−]
(2) C[−] is non-modal just if it is generated without the clause box C[−].
(3) C[−] does not bind u just if it is generated without the clause let box u⇐ C[−] in C[−]
nor the clause λu:A.C[−].
We write C[M ] for the term that results from (capture-insensitive) substitution of the term
M for the hole [−] of the term context C[−].
The equational rules that pertain to all our systems can be found in Figure 6, whereas
the equations for the various modalities can be found in Figure 7. To obtain the complete
set, one should also add congruences, and rules that makes equality an equivalence relation.
We need not include substitution rules:
Theorem 7.1. Structural rules of weakening, exchange and contraction for contexts are
admissible in the equational theory. Furthermore, the following rules are derivable in the
equational theory:
(1) Substitution:
∆ ; Γ, x:A ⊢M = N : C ∆ ; Γ ⊢ P = Q : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢M [P/x] = N [Q/x] : C
(2) Modal Substitution; for example, in the case of DK:
∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢M = N : C · ;∆ ⊢ P = Q : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢M [P/u] = N [Q/u] : C
7.1.1. Commuting Conversions. The most interesting rules are the unavoidable commuting
conversions that arise from the study of the categorical semantics of our systems.
The rule (commweak) is a ‘weakening’ rule that disposes of an explicit substitution
that binds a non-occurring variable. This rule has never been considered in the study of
dual-context systems, for DILL (Barber, 1996) was a linear system, and Davies and Pfenning
(Pfenning and Davies, 2001) studied neither reduction nor equality. However, a similar rule
was proposed by Goubault-Larrecq (1996) in his study of Bierman and de Paiva’s calculus
for S4. This rule was later included in (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000).
(commcontr) is a ‘contraction’ rule. This is also unfamiliar in dual-context calculi—
essentially for the same reasons as (commweak)—but is also well-known in Bierman–de
Paiva style calculi as a ‘garbage collection’ rule: see (Goubault-Larrecq, 1996), (Bierman and de Paiva,
2000) and (Kakutani, 2007).
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Function Spaces
∆ ; Γ, x:A ⊢M : B ∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : A
(→ β)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ (λx:A.M)N =M [N/x] : B
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A→ B x 6∈ fv (M)
(→ η)
∆ ; Γ ⊢M = λx:A.Mx : A→ B
Modality
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A
(η)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in box u =M : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢M = N : A ∆ ; Γ ⊢ P = Q : C
(let-cong)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in P = let box u⇐ N in Q : B
Commuting Conversions
(commlet)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ C[let box u⇐M in N ] : C C[−] is non-modal, does not bind u
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in C[N ] = C[let box u⇐M in N ] : C
(commweak)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : C ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A u 6∈ fv (N)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N = N : C
(commcontr)
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A ∆, u:A, v:A ; Γ ⊢ N : C u, v 6∈ fv (M)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in let box v ⇐M in N = let box w ⇐M in N [w,w/u, v] = N : C
Remark. In addition to the above, one should also include (a) rules that ensure that equal-
ity is an equivalence relation, and (b) congruence rules for λ-abstraction and application.
Figure 6: Equations for all systems
‘Exchange’ is treated as part of the much more general rule (commlet), which makes
‘let’ constructs commute with all term formers except box (−). In its most general form, it
is the equality
C[let box u⇐M in N ] = let box u⇐M in C[N ]
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For DK and DT:
· ; ∆ ⊢M : A ∆, u : A ; Γ ⊢ N : C
(βK)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐ box M in N = N [M/x] : C
· ; ∆ ⊢M = N : A
(congK)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M = box N : A
For DK4:
∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢M⊥ : A ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : C
(βK4)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐ box M in N = N [M/x] : C
∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢M⊥ = N⊥ : A
(congK4)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M = box N : A
For DGL:
∆ ; ∆⊥, z⊥ : A ⊢M⊥ : A ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : C
(βGL)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐ fix z in box M in N = N [M [fix z in box M/z] /u] : C
∆ ; ∆⊥, z⊥ : A ⊢M⊥ = N⊥ : A
(congGL)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ fix z in box M = fix z in box N : A
For DS4:
∆ ; · ⊢M : A ∆, u : A ; Γ ⊢ N : C
(βS4)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐ box M in N = N [M/x] : C
∆ ; · ⊢M = N : A
(congS4)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M = box N : A
Figure 7: Equations for the modalities
for any C that does not bind u, and whose hole [−] is not included within a box (−). Read
in one direction, (commlet) allows one to ‘pull’ an explicit substitution to an outermost
position, as long as nothing extra is bound in the process. In the other direction, it allows one
to ‘push’ an explicit substitution as deeply as one can without creating any free occurrences.
A variant of this rule was considered in the study of DILL by Barber (1996), and is also
mentioned by Kakutani (2007). We remark that (commlet) includes a form of ‘exchange’
as a special case, by swapping of the order of non-interacting explicit substitutions; this
special case is thoroughly studied by Goubault-Larrecq (1996).
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7.1.2. The η rule. As is usual with positive type formers, of which  is an example, there are
two ways to express the η rule. The first is the straightforward way, viz. that introduction
is post-inverse to elimination for any term of the type: for any term ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A,
∆ ; Γ ⊢M = let box u⇐M in box u : A
The second version of that is a kind of Paul’s rule,8 which allows us to η-expand a term of
modal type, no matter where (or how many times) it is found in a well-typed term:
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A ∆ ; Γ, x : A ⊢ N : B
∆ ; Γ ⊢ N [M/x] = let box v ⇐M in N [box v/x] : B
In fact,
Theorem 7.2. In the presence of commuting conversions, the η rule and the modal Paul’s
rule are equivalent.
Proof. Certainly the η rule is a special case of Paul’s rule. In the opposite direction, we
proceed by induction on the derivation of the term N . Most cases are simple. For products,
we have that
〈N1, N2〉[M/x]
≡ { substitution }
〈N1[M/x], N2[M/x]〉
= { IH, twice }
〈let box u⇐M in N1[box u/x], let box v ⇐M in N2[box v/x]〉
= { (commlet), twice }
let box u⇐M in let box v ⇐M in 〈N1[box u/x], N2[box v/x]〉
= { (commcontr) }
let box w ⇐M in 〈N1[box w/x], N2[box w/x]〉
≡ { substitution }
let box w ⇐M in N [box w/x]
A similar ‘collapsing step’ is also needed in the case of let. The case for box M is simple, as in
all of our type theories x does not occur inM ; the result hence follows by (commweak).
Idempotence. The (commlet) rule avoided instances of the commutation between a let
and a box. If such commutations were allowed, we would have, for example, the following
equality in DS4:
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box (let box u⇐M in N) = let box u⇐M in box N : C
for ∆ ; · ⊢ M : A and ∆, u : A ; · ⊢ N : C. We will later show that these rules are
sound for the categorical semantics of DS4 if and only if the comonad used to interpret 
is idempotent.
In fact, there are three equivalent ways to present idempotence in DS4. The first two
roughly say that box (−) and let commute. The third is a strong form of Paul’s rule, this
time for modal variables.
8So called here because a similar rule for coproducts was taught to the author by Paul Blain Levy.
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Theorem 7.3. The following rules are equivalent
(1)
∆ ; · ⊢M : A ∆, u : A ; · ⊢ N : B
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box (let box u⇐M in N) = let box u⇐M in box N : B
(2)
∆ ; Γ ⊢ C[let box u⇐M in N ] : B C[−] does not bind u
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in C[N ] = C[let box u⇐M in N ] : B
(3)
∆ ; · ⊢M : A ∆, u : A ; Γ ⊢ N : B
∆ ; Γ ⊢ N [M/u] = let box v ⇐M in N [box v/u] : B
Proof. (1) is a special case of (2). To prove (2) from (1), we proceed by induction on C: use
the commuting conversion (commlet) for the non-modal cases, and then (1) for the modal
case C[−]
def
= box C ′[−]. If we have the premises of (1), we can show that, by (3),
(box (let box u⇐ v in N)) [M/v] : B
is equal to
let box w⇐M in (box (let box u⇐ v in N)) [box w/v] : B
The first expression simplifies to box (let box u⇐M in N), and the second to
let box w⇐M in (box (let box u⇐ box v in N))
which, by one step of β-reduction and α-conversion is equal to let box u⇐M in box N . We
can show (3) from (1) by induction on the derivation of N as before, but using (1) for the
crucial case of box N ′.
7.2. Categorical interpretation. We are now fully equipped to define the categorical se-
mantics of our dual-context systems. For background on the categorical semantics of simply-
typed λ-calculus in cartesian closed categories, we refer to the classics by Lambek and Scott
(1988) and Crole (1993), as well as the detailed presentation of Abramsky and Tzevelekos
(2011).
We start by interpreting types and contexts. Given any Kripke category (C,×,1, F ),
and a map I(−) associating each base type pi with an object I(pi) ∈ C, we define an objectJAK ∈ C for every type A by induction:
JpiK def= I(pi)
JA→ BK def= JBKJAK
JAK def= F JAK
Then, given a well-defined context ∆;Γ where ∆ = u1:B1, . . . un:Bn and Γ = x1:A1, . . . , xm:Am,
we let J∆ ; ΓK def= FB1 × · · · × FBn ×A1 × · · · ×Am
where the product is, as ever, left-associating.
We then extend the semantic map J−K to associate an arrow
J∆ ; Γ ⊢M : AK : J∆ ; ΓK → JAK
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Definitions for all calculi
q
∆ ; Γ, x:A,Γ′ ⊢ x : A
y def
= π :
q
∆ ; Γ, x:A,Γ′
y
−→ JAK
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ 〈M,N〉 : A×BK def= 〈J∆ ; Γ ⊢M : AK , J∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : BK〉
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ πi(M) : AiK def= πi ◦ J∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A1 ×A2K
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ λx:A. M : A→ BK def= λ (J∆ ; Γ, x : A ⊢M : BK) : J∆ ; ΓK −→ JBKJAK
J∆ ; Γ ⊢MN : BK def= ev ◦ 〈J∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A→ BK , J∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : AK〉
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N : CK def= J∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : CK ◦ 〈−→π∆, J∆ ; Γ ⊢M : AK ,−→πΓ〉
Definitions for various modalities
q
∆, u:A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢ u : A
y
L
def
= ǫJAK ◦ π :
q
∆, u:A,∆′ ; Γ
y
→ JAK (for L ∈ {T,S4})
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : AKL def= J· ; ∆ ⊢M : AK• ◦ π∆;Γ∆ (for L ∈ {K,T})
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : AKK4 def=
r
∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢M⊥ : A
z#
◦ π∆;Γ∆
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ fix z in box M : AKGL def=
r
∆ ; ∆⊥, z⊥ : A ⊢M⊥ : A
z†
◦ π∆;Γ∆
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : AKS4 def= J∆ ; · ⊢M : AK∗ ◦ π∆;Γ∆
Figure 8: Categorical Semantics
of the category C to each derivation ∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A. The definition for rules common to all
calculi are the same for all logics, but we use each of the maps defined in §6 to interpret
the different introduction rules for the modality. To do that we need more than just a
Kripke category: for K4 we need a Kripke-4 category; for T a Kripke-T category, for GL a
Go¨del-Lo¨b category, and for S4 a Bierman-de Paiva category.
The full definition is given in Figure 8. The map
π∆;Γ∆ : J∆ ; ΓK → J∆ ; ·K
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is the obvious projection. Moreover, the notation 〈−→π∆, f,
−→πΓ〉 stands for
〈−→π∆, f,
−→πΓ〉
def
= 〈π1, . . . , πn, f, πn+1, . . . , πn+m〉
7.3. Soundness. The main tools in proving soundness of our interpretation are (a) lemmas
giving the categorical interpretation of various admissible rules, and (b) a fundamental
lemma relating substitution of terms to composition in the category. In the sequel we often
use informal vector notation for contexts: for example, we write ~u : ~B for the context u1 :
B1, . . . , un : Bm. We also write [ ~N/~u] for the simultaneous, capture-avoiding substitution
[N1/u1, . . . , Nm/un].
First, we interpret weakening and exchange.
Lemma 7.4 (Semantics of Weakening).
(1) Let ∆ ; Γ, x:C,Γ′ ⊢M : A with x 6∈ fv (M). Thenq
∆ ; Γ, x:C,Γ′ ⊢M : A
y
=
q
∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢M : A
y
◦ π
where π : J∆ ; Γ, x:C,Γ′K → J∆ ; Γ,Γ′K is the obvious projection.
(2) Let ∆, u:B,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A with u 6∈ fv (M). Thenq
∆, u:B,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A
y
=
q
∆,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A
y
◦ π
where π : J∆, u:B,∆′ ; ΓK → J∆,∆′ ; ΓK is the obvious projection.
Proof. By induction on the two derivations. All cases are straightforward. The modal one
uses Propositions 6.6(2), 6.9(5), 6.13(2), and 6.20.
Lemma 7.5 (Semantics of Exchange).
(1) Let ∆ ; Γ, x:C, y:D,Γ′ ⊢M : A. Thenq
∆ ; Γ, x:C, y:D,Γ′ ⊢M : A
y
=
q
∆ ; Γ, y:D,x:C,Γ′ ⊢M : A
y
◦ (∼=)
where (∼=) : J∆ ; Γ, x:C, y:D,Γ′K ∼=−→ J∆ ; Γ, y:D,x:C,Γ′K is the obvious isomorphism.
(2) Let ∆, u:C, v:D,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A. Thenq
∆, u:C, v:D,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A
y
=
q
∆, v:D,u:C,∆′ ; Γ ⊢M : A
y
◦ (∼=)
where (∼=) : J∆, u:C, v:D ; ΓK ∼=−→ J∆, v:D,u:C ; ΓK is the obvious isomorphism.
Proof. By induction on the two derivations. All cases are straightforward.
Then, we move on to something particular to the cases of T and S4, namely the interpreta-
tion of the Modal Dereliction rule—see Theorem 4.7.
Lemma 7.6 (Semantics of Dereliction). Let ∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢DL M : A where L ∈ {T,S4} and
Γ = ~z : ~C. Thenq
∆,Γ ; Γ′ ⊢M : A
y
L
=
q
∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢M : A
y
L
◦
(−−→
id∆ ×
−→ǫCi ×
−−→
idΓ′
)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∆ ; Γ,Γ′ ⊢DL M : A. All cases are straightforward.
The case for (E) depends on the semantics of exchange lemma.
We also need to know that ‘boxing’ a variable results in the obvious projection. This depends
essentially on the fact our functors are product-preserving (and not just lax monoidal).
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Lemma 7.7 (Identity Lemma). For (ui : Bi) ∈ ∆, and L ∈ {K,K4,T,S4},
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box ui : BiKL = π∆;ΓBi
We aim to show that substitution in the syntax corresponds to composition in the
semantics. To make this result work, we need to introduce a box (−) construct for GL, we
will write
box M
def
= fix w in box M
with w,w⊥ fresh. It is then not hard to see that the introduction rule of K4 is admissible for
GL whenM has no occurrences of w⊥: we simply use weakening followed by the introduction
rule for GL. This derived operation is reflected in the semantics by the equation
Proposition 7.8. J∆ ; Γ ⊢DGL box M : AK = q∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢DGL M⊥ : Ay# ◦ π∆;Γ∆
Proof. By the semantics of weakening and Proposition 6.21.
In short: when the variable that is being recursed over does not occur freely, the situation
degenerates to that of K4.
Lemma 7.9 (Semantics of Substitution). Suppose that ~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢DL P : C. Let
∆ ; Γ ⊢DL Mi : Ai for i = 1, . . . , n, and let
αi
def
= J∆ ; Γ ⊢Mi : AiKL
If either
(1) L ∈ {K,T} and · ; ∆ ⊢ Nj : Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m, or
(2) L ∈ {K4,GL} and ∆ ; ∆⊥ ⊢ N⊥j : Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m, or
(3) L = S4 and ∆ ; · ⊢ Nj : Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m,
then, letting for j = 1, . . . ,m
βj
def
= J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box Nj : BjKL
we have thatr
∆ ; Γ ⊢ P [ ~N/~u, ~M/~x] : C
z
L
=
r
~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢ P : C
z
L
◦ 〈β1, . . . , βm, α1, . . . , αn〉
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ~u : ~B;~x : ~A ⊢ P : C. Most cases are straightforward,
and use a combination of standard equations that hold in cartesian closed categories—see
§6.1 or (Crole, 1993, §2)—in order to perform calculations very close the ones detailed in
(Abramsky and Tzevelekos, 2011, §1.6.5). Because of the precise definitions we have used,
we also need to make use of Lemma 7.4 to interpret weakening whenever variables in the
context do not occur freely in the term. For the modal rules we use many of the equations
we showed in 6, e.g in Propositions 6.6, 6.9, 6.13, and so on.
Theorem 7.10 (Soundness). If ∆ ; Γ ⊢DL M = N : A, then we have that
J∆ ; Γ ⊢M : AKL = J∆ ; Γ ⊢ N : AKL
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∆ ; Γ ⊢DL M = N : A. The congruence cases are
clear, as are the majority of the ordinary clauses—see Crole (1993) and Abramsky and Tzevelekos
(2011). The rules that remain are (η), the many variants of (β), and the commuting
conversions.
First, we prove the modal β and η cases by direct calculation. To do so, we use Lemma
7.7, and hence product preservation is essential not just for (η), but for (β) as well.
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Let ∆ = ~u : ~B and Γ = ~x : ~A. We then calculate:
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐ box M in N : CK
= {definition }
J∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : CK ◦ 〈−→π∆, J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : AK ,−→πΓ〉
= {Lemma 7.7 }
J∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : CK ◦ 〈−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box ui : BiK, J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : AK ,−−−−−−−−−−−→J∆ ; Γ ⊢ xi : AiK〉
= {Lemma 7.9 }
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ N [~ui/~ui,M/u, ~xi/~xi] : CK
This covers all cases save GL. For that, it suffices to show that
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ fix z in box M : AK = J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M [fix z in box M/z] : AK
and then surreptitiously swap the first expression with the second in the above calculation
just before using the substitution lemma.
The case of (η) is even simpler, and follows immediately from Lemma 7.7.
The commuting conversions for weakening and contraction are straightforward. (commlet)
requires a subsidiary induction on contexts C[−], which follows from the naturality of the
various operations of the CCC.
Idempotence. If the comonad (F, ǫ, δ) provided as part of a Bierman-de Paiva category is
idempotent, then it is true that more equations are sound. We have shown the equivalence
between three such equations in §7.1, so it suffices to prove only one of them sound:
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ box (let box u⇐M in N) : BK
= { definitions }
(J∆, u : A ; · ⊢ N : BK ◦ 〈id, J∆ ; · ⊢M : AK〉)∗
= { Theorem 6.12 }
J∆, u : A ; · ⊢ N : BK∗ ◦ 〈id, J∆ ; · ⊢M : AK〉
= { definitions }
J∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in box N : BK
7.4. Completeness. To complete our investigation, we shall sketch the proof that our
categorical semantics is complete; that is:
Theorem 7.11 (Completeness).
(1) If J∆ ; Γ ⊢DK M : AK = J∆ ; Γ ⊢DK N : AK in every Kripke category, then the judgment
∆ ; Γ ⊢DK M = N : A is derivable.
(2) If J∆ ; Γ ⊢DK4 M : AK = J∆ ; Γ ⊢DK4 N : AK in every Kripke-4 category, then the judg-
ment ∆ ; Γ ⊢DK4 M = N : A is derivable.
(3) If J∆ ; Γ ⊢DGL M : AK = J∆ ; Γ ⊢DGL N : AK in every Go¨del-Lo¨b category, then the judg-
ment ∆ ; Γ ⊢DGL M = N : A is derivable.
(4) If J∆ ; Γ ⊢DT M : AK = J∆ ; Γ ⊢DT N : AK in every Kripke-T category, then the judg-
ment ∆ ; Γ ⊢DT M = N : A is derivable.
(5) If J∆ ; Γ ⊢DS4 M : AK = J∆ ; Γ ⊢DS4 N : AK in every Bierman-de Paiva category, then
the judgment ∆ ; Γ ⊢DS4 M = N : A is derivable.
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Only the last of these cases has been obtained before, for a calculus that includes the
diamond modality, and can be found in the diploma thesis of Marntirosian (2014).
By the method of Lindenbaum and Tarski, to prove this theorem it suffices to construct
a suitable category of each sort from the bare syntax of each calculus. Thus, we construct
a Kripke category CK based on the syntax of DK, a Bierman-de Paiva category CS4 based
on the syntax of DS4, and so on. The reasoning then proceeds as follows: if an equation
holds in all categories of this sort, then it holds in the one made of syntax, which—and we
must also show this—yields the required equality.
To perform the aforementioned syntactic construction, we follow a pattern that we
learned from Cˇubric´ et al. (1998). The objects of all our categories will be two-zoned lists
of types,
〈 ~B| ~A〉
and the morphisms 〈 ~B| ~A〉 −→ 〈 ~D| ~C〉 shall be two-zoned lists of terms, quotiented up to
provable renaming and equality.
In the first zone, the typing will have a form that will be readily substitutable for a
modal variable. For CK and CT, the morphisms will be
〈· ; ~u : ~B ⊢ N1 : D1, . . . , · ; ~u : ~B ⊢ Nl : Dl |
~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢M1 : C1, . . . , ~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢Mk : Ck〉
whereas for CS4 they will be
〈~u : ~B ; · ⊢ N1 : D1, . . . , ~u : ~B ; · ⊢ Nl : Dl |
~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢M1 : C1, . . . , ~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢Mk : Ck〉
Finally, in CK4 and CGL morphisms will respect the structure of complementary variables
and their relationship to substitution, and so take the form
〈~u : ~B ; ~u⊥ : ~B ⊢ N⊥1 : D1, . . . , ~u : ~B ;
~u⊥ : ~B ⊢ N⊥l : Dl |
~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢M1 : C1, . . . , ~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢Mk : Ck〉
Composition is then defined by substitution, and the identity morphisms will be simply
occurences of variables; e.g. in CK and CT they will be
〈· ; ~u : ~B ⊢ u1 : B1, . . . , · ; ~u : ~B ⊢ um : Bm |
~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢ x1 : A1, . . . , ~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢ xn : An〉
It is easy to verify that composition is associative and that the proposed arrows are identities:
associativity corresponds to the so-called substitution lemma, and identities vanish up to
renaming.
This constitutes a cartesian closed category. Products are defined by
〈
−→
B |
−→
A 〉 × 〈
−→
D |
−→
C 〉
def
= 〈
−→
B,
−→
D |
−→
A,
−→
C 〉
Mediating morphisms are constructed by composition, and projections consist of vectors of
variable occurrences. All the necessary product equations hold by inspection. Exponentials
defined pointwise; for example, in the case of K,
〈
−→
D,
−→
B 〉
〈
−→
B,
−→
A 〉 def
=
〈−−−−→
D〈·|
−→
B 〉,
−−−−→
C〈
−→
B |
−→
A〉,
〉
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where
C〈
−→
B,
−→
A〉 def= B1 → (B2 → . . . (Bm → (A1 · · · → An → C)) . . . )
whereas, in the case of K4/GL,
〈
−→
D,
−→
B 〉
〈
−→
B,
−→
A〉 def
=
〈−−−−−→
D〈
−→
B |
−→
B 〉,
−−−−→
C〈
−→
B |
−→
A〉,
〉
with C〈
−→
B,
−→
A〉 as before. The map λ(−) is defined by a combination of λ-abstraction and
judicious use of let constructs. The evaluation map involves a application to strings of
‘boxed’ variables (box u) and ordinary occurrences, and showing unicity involves both the
η rule for functions as well as the η rule for the modality.
Finally, we construct a monoidal functor on each category. In all cases, its construction
is indicated by the following simple result, which holds uniformly in all our calculi:
Proposition 7.12. If −→u :
−→
B ;−→x :
−→
A ⊢M : C, then
−→v :
−−→
B ;−→y :
−→
A ⊢ let box −→x ⇐ −→y in box (let box −→u ⇐ −→v in M) : C
This action defines a strict monoidal functor on each CL. Moreover, the terms ax4 : A→
 and axT : A→ A defined in §4.4.1 constitute comultiplications and counits: they are
natural and satisfy the appropriate diagrams, leading one to conclusion that CK is a Kripke
category, CK4 and CGL are Kripke-4 categories, and so on. We shall only construct the
modal fixed point combinators of CGL for the simple case of single types; then Proposition
6.20 suffices to guarantee that we have a Go¨del-Lo¨b category. If A
def
= 〈D | C〉, we have
FA = 〈D | C〉
AFA =
〈
2D → D → D | 2D → C → C
〉
F
(
AFA
)
=
〈

(
2D → D → D
)
| 
(
2D → C → C
)〉
So we first have to construct a term
· ; x : 
(
2D → D → D
)
⊢ dd[x] : D
which we do by
dd[x]
def
= let box w⇐ x in fix z in box w(ax4 z)z
Notice that dd[f⊥] ≡ (dd[f ])⊥, so
f : 
(
2D → D → D
)
; f⊥ : 
(
2D → D → D
)
⊢ (dd[f ])⊥ : C
and we let this be the first component of the combinator. The second component shall be
a term
f : 
(
2D → D → D
)
; g : 
(
2D → C → C
)
⊢ ds[f, g] : D
which we construct by a judicious use of dd:
ds[f, g]
def
= let box u⇐ f in let box v ⇐ g in fix z in box v(ax4(dd[u]))z
To complete the argument, one shows by induction on M that
Lemma 7.13.r
~u : ~B ; ~x : ~A ⊢M : A
z
L
=
〈
−
∣∣∣· ; ~v : ~B,~x : ~A ⊢ let box ~u⇐ ~v in M : A〉 ∈ CL
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8. Conclusion & further directions
We have thus achieved a full Curry-Howard-Lambek isomorphism for a handful of modal
logics, spanning the logical aspect (Hilbert systems and provability), the computational
aspect (a study of reduction), and the categorical aspect (proof-relevant semantics).
In order to achieve the connection at the first junction—that between logic and computation—
we have employed a systematic pattern based on sequent calculus, namely a translation of
(right or single) modal sequent calculus rules to introduction rules for dual context sys-
tems. This has worked remarkably well. It is our hope that there is a deeper aspect to
this pattern—perhaps even a theorem to the effect that sequent calculi rules for which cut
elimination is provable can immediately be translated to a well-behaved dual context sys-
tem. Of course, this is quite a long way from our current grasp, but we believe it is worth
investigating.
In addition, it is also our hope that our calculi elucidate the computational behaviour
of a handful of necessity modalities. In fact, the author believes that modalities can be
used to control the ‘flow of data’ in a programming language, in the sense that they create
regions of the language whose intercommunication is restricted, in one way or another. For
example, one can handwavingly argue that S4 guarantees that ‘only modal variables flow
into terms of modal type,’ whereas K additionally ensures that no modal data flows into
a term of non-modal type. However, these examples are—at this stage—mere intuitions.
Making such intuitions rigorous and proving them should amount to a sort of safety property.
A first result of this style is the free variables theorem (Theorem 4.3), but the author finds it
rather weak. We believe that it can be strengthened by making use of the second junction,
that between computation and categories: investigating categorical models for these calculi
can perhaps give a succinct and rigorous expression to these intuitions.
Having such safety properties can make these calculi extraordinarily useful for program-
ming language applications. For example, it seems that K is stratified in two levels: ‘the
world under a box,’ and ‘the world outside boxes.’ The distinction between compile-time vs.
run-time—or even code vs. value—is known to be expressible in terms of modalities: this
result is due to Davies and Pfenning (2001), and was the primary motivation for weakening
DILL to DS4. Moreover, the authors in op. cit. remark that, for the purposes of this
analysis, the necessary “fragment corresponds to a weaker modal logic, K, in which we drop
the assumption in S4 that the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive [...].” Thus,
we may think of K as the logic of program construction, i.e. a form of metaprogramming
that happens in one stage.
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